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SUMMARY TABLE 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Output (Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 4.2 3.3 1.9 2.4
 
3.0 
2.5
 
2.6 
9.5
 
8.7 
5.9
 
5.6 
7.6
 
7.7 
3.8
 
3.6 
3.5
 
3.33.1 
2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.8 5.3 1.8 2.5 3.0 
Investment 27.9 61.2 -22.3 12.6 13.3 
Exports 38.4 4.6 6.9 7.4 7.8 
Imports 26.0 16.4 -6.2 9.7 11.0 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 25.6 5.1 7.8 4.8 3.9 
Gross National Product (GNP) 16.4 9.6 5.2 4.7 3.9 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
     
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -0.3 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.5 3.5 
      
Labour Market 
     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,058 2,133 2,195 2,254 2,298 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 226 195 158 129 108 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.4 4.5 
      
Public Finance 
     
General Government Balance (€bn) -5.0 -1.8 -0.8 0.5 1.8 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.6 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 76.9 72.8 70.9 68.0 64.2 
      
External Trade 
     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 28.6 9.2 37.1 29.4 23.7 
Current Account (% of GNP) 13.9 4.1 15.4 11 8.9 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Spr in g  201 8  |  i i i  
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 99.7 3.2 1.3 1.9 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.4 29.5 4.2 -2.3 1.8 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.7 69.5 -20.8 2.0 -22.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 355.6 6.1 -0.7 6.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.0 
   
Final Demand 550.1 556.3 1.1 0.1 1.0 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  274.4 260.1 -5.2  1.1 -6.2 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 275.6 296.1 7.5 -0.4 7.8 
Net Factor Payments  -48.8 -54.9 
   
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 241.2 6.4 1.1 5.2 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 80.3 84.4 4.2 5.2 
Other 107.4 117.6 10.1 9.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 191.4 205.8 14.4 7.5 
Net Factor Payments -48.8 -54.9 -6.1 12.5 
National Income 142.6 150.9 8.3 5.8 
Depreciation 64.5 69.4 5.0 7.8 
GNP at Factor Cost 207.0 220.3 13.3 6.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.7 20.9 1.2 5.9 
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 241.2 14.4 6.4 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 60.8 95.2 34.5 
F -47.6 -53.8 -6.1 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.3 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 9.2 37.1 27.9 
as % of GNP 4.1 15.4 11.6 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.7 103.1 3.4 1.0 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.5 30.6 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.5 80.4 15.7 2.8 12.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 355.6 385.8 8.5 1.0 7.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 556.3 603.0 8.4 1.2 7.1 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  260.1 294.9 13.4 3.4 9.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 296.1 308.0 4.0 -0.7 4.8 
Net Factor Payments  -54.9 -57.7 
   
GNP at Market Prices 241.2 250.3 3.8 -0.9 4.7 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 3.4 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 84.4 88.9 4.5 5.3 
Other 117.6 120.6 3.0 2.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 205.8 213.3 7.5 3.7 
Net Factor Payments -54.9 -57.7 -2.8 5.1 
National Income 150.9 155.6 4.8 3.2 
Depreciation 69.5 73.1 3.6 5.2 
GNP at Factor Cost 220.3 228.7 8.4 3.8 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.9 21.6 0.7 3.4 
GNP at Market Prices 241.2 250.3 9.1 3.8 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 95.2 90.7 -4.5 
F -53.8 -56.5 -2.7 
Net Transfers -4.3 -4.8 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 37.1 29.4 -7.7 
as % of GNP 15.4 11.7 -3.1 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 103.1 106.8 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 30.6 31.8 4.1 1.0 3.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 80.4 93.4 16.2 2.6 13.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 385.8 423.5 9.8 1.8 7.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 603.0 658.5 9.2 1.8 7.3 
less:    
   
Imports of Goods and Services  294.4 335.4 13.7 2.4 11.0 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 308.1 323.0 4.9 0.9 4.8 
Net Factor Payments  -57.7 -60.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 250.3 263.1 5.1 1.2 4.7 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.4 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 88.9 93.7 4.8 5.4 
Other 120.6 126.4 5.9 4.9 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 213.3 224.0 10.7 5.0 
Net Factor Payments -57.7 -60.0 -2.3 3.9 
National Income 155.6 164.1 8.4 5.4 
Depreciation 73.1 76.7 3.6 4.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 228.7 240.7 12.0 5.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 21.6 22.3 0.8 3.5 
GNP at Market Prices 250.3 263.1 12.8 5.1 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 90.7 87.8 -2.9 
F -56.5 -58.7 -2.2 
Net Transfers -4.8 -5.3 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 29.4 23.7 -5.6 
as % of GNP 11.7 9.0 -2.1 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
Initial official estimates indicate that the Irish economy grew by 7.8 per cent in 
2017. Preliminary data for 2018 indicate that the economy looks set to 
experience further expansion in the present year. Strong domestic sources of 
growth along with improving international conditions lead to an expected growth 
rate of 4.8 per cent in 2018. We also expect that these components will result in 
growth of approximately 3.9 per cent in 2019. In preparing forecasts for 2019, we 
assume that a European Economic Agreement (EEA) will exist between the UK 
and the EU. 
 
Assessing the continued strong performance of the Irish economy is still 
bedevilled by difficulties with the National Accounts. Estimates of overall output 
growth as well as some of the major components of growth, investment and the 
terms of trade, are influenced by large transactions of a select number of firms. 
While there are ongoing efforts to provide additional indicators of economic 
activity, it is now apparent that a more comprehensive approach to the 
preparation of the National Accounts is required. As well as the standard set of 
indicators, a parallel set of accounts which are not impacted by these large 
transactions should also be prepared. Such accounts should be available on both 
the output and the expenditure side. 
 
From a policy perspective, this becomes all the more pressing given the 
persistently strong rates of growth experienced in recent years, thereby giving 
rise to the possibility of overheating in the domestic economy. It is almost 
impossible to derive accurate estimates of sustainable economic growth based on 
the current set of National Accounts. Given the large amount of public 
investment proposed in the recent national development plan, it is imperative 
that reliable estimates of sustainable economic growth are available so that 
policymakers can accurately gauge when the economy is encountering capacity 
constraints.  
 
The ongoing uncertainty concerning the UK Government’s stance on remaining in 
the EU Single Market and Customs Union is of particular relevance to the Irish 
economy. The implications for domestic consumer prices of new tariffs between 
the UK and Irish economy are examined in a Special Article to the Commentary. 
Lawless and Morgenroth examine the contribution of UK imports to overall 
household expenditure in Ireland and their exposure to tariffs and other cost 
increases from possible restrictions on trade. They estimate that the imposition 
of such tariffs could increase the annual cost of the typical consumption basket 
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for the average household between €892 (increase in non-tariff trade costs) and 
€1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases). Along with the estimated impact 
of a hard Brexit on Irish fiscal space in Garcia (2017),1 this represents another 
tangible example of how a hard Brexit would impact the domestic economy. 
 
                                                          
 
1
  Garcia Rodriguez, A., 2017. ‘The Impact of Public Investment’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn 2017, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
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The International Economy 
 
Forecasts for the international economy have been recently revised upwards in 
light of robust, well-distributed global growth. Contributing factors towards this 
improved outlook include the strong performance among major nations such as 
Germany, Spain, Canada and China.2 This, coupled with newly passed US tax 
policy adjustments, has resulted in IMF projections for global growth in 2017 
rising by 0.1 percentage points to 3.7 per cent. Global growth is expected to 
accelerate to 3.9 per cent in 2018 and 2019.  
 
The Eurozone maintains its improving performance as record-low interest rates 
look likely to be maintained in the short run. The combined effects of prolonged 
accommodative monetary policy, strong labour market performance and robust 
consumer sentiment are important components of current growth and look likely 
to persist over the short to medium term. While all of these factors are indicative 
of a recovering economy, the annualised inflation rate for the Euro Area remains 
relatively muted at 1.3 per cent in January 2018. Gros (2018) addresses this issue 
in a recent CEPS report, suggesting inflation is largely under-estimated in the Euro 
Area relative to other economic regions. This is due to the Euro Area’s exclusion 
of the cost of owner occupied housing, which is included in US statistics.3 When 
housing is incorporated into inflation estimates, the Euro Area rate is closer to 
the 2 per cent inflation rate target. FocusEconomics estimates European GDP 
growth of 2.5 per cent for 2017 while unemployment should fall below double 
digits to 9.1 per cent. The improved Eurozone performance increases the 
probability that the ECB will begin to unwind exceptional monetary policy 
measures and increase the policy rate. 
 
Gross Domestic Product in the UK is estimated by the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) to have increased by 1.7 per cent in 2017 compared with growth of 1.9 per 
cent in 2016. In our previous Commentary, we considered in detail the UK and 
noted that declining UK productivity growth was evident even before the Brexit 
referendum had occurred. Recent data from the UK suggest moderate growth 
will occur in 2018, however continued uncertainty regarding the exact nature of 
Brexit still hangs over the medium-term outlook. Since the referendum in Q2 
2016, the Sterling to Euro exchange rate has depreciated by 12.8 per cent, while 
there have been substantial levels of volatility in net investment; an immediate 
net outflow of funds in 2016 was followed by a significant inflow in 2017. The 
 
                                                          
 
2
  IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2018. 
3
  Gros, D., 2018. Persistent low inflation in the Euro Area: Mismeasurement rather than a cause for concern? CEPS, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, PE 614.214. 
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recent weakness of the Pound has resulted in the value of imports increasing 
significantly. This has resulted in UK inflation rates reaching 3 per cent, far above 
the Bank of England’s target rate. The latest Bank of England commentaries 
suggests rates may increase faster than previously expected in order to 
counteract these forces. Consumption should thus remain subdued as real wages 
are likely to remain static. Compared with other advanced economies, the 
outlook for the UK economy seems to be the most precarious which is 
problematic for Ireland given our strong economic ties. 
 
The short-term growth outlook for the US has improved significantly, largely due 
to the introduction of major expansionary fiscal policy measures. In 2017, the US 
economy grew by 2.3 per cent with unemployment rates falling by 0.5 
percentage points to 4.4 per cent. Significant tax reductions and windfalls from 
tax holidays are expected to increase US growth in 2018. The temporary nature of 
the tax holiday may contribute towards increased Balance of Payment inflows on 
a short-term basis. Introducing these stimulative policy measures during the 
current stage of the business cycle does risk overheating the US economy. An 
element of overheating may have manifested itself through the higher than 
expected US inflation rate of 2.1 per cent in January. Recent comments from the 
new Chairman of the Federal Reserve suggest that the US economy may be facing 
a period of gradual interest rates increases.4  
 
Elsewhere in January, the Bank of Japan maintained its policy of quantitative 
easing in order to reach 2.0 per cent inflation. Japan’s trade outlook has 
improved given that the 11 remaining countries to the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
are expected to sign the deal in early March. Although growth rates improved to 
1.7 per cent this year, the possibility of reduced labour supply threatens to slow 
further growth. For the first time in over two decades, unemployment fell to 2.8 
per cent as of December 2017. The ratio of jobs to jobseekers rose for the month 
to 1.59:1 suggesting there are currently 159 openings for every 100 job seekers 
within the labour market. Improved labour market activity has not fed into wage 
growth with private consumption still weak as a result. 
 
In 2017, China surpassed the government’s GDP target of 6.5 per cent growth for 
the year by 0.3 percentage points. Investment growth has moderated as the 
Chinese government attempts to rebalance growth towards services from high-
capital intensity industries and also tries to reduce industrial pollution. According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the services sector now dominates 
GDP contributions, outpacing manufacturing since 2015. The improved global 
 
                                                          
 
4
  Erosion of twin deficits would further weaken of the Dollar and could effectively place increased pressure upon 
financial market agents to sell out of such losses. There is a risk that a weakening Dollar combined with stimulus 
forcing an early form of monetary tightening could lead to a major correction in Dollar-based asset prices.   
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outlook has resulted in the Chinese economy moving above target GDP growth 
rates through improvements in trade. More generally, other developing countries 
have continued benefiting from improved global demand with global trade 
volumes expected to increase by 5.9 per cent for emerging market economies. 
According to revisions in the IMF’s global outlook, Asian economies are 
particularly resurgent, averaging 4.7 per cent GDP growth for 2017. Latin 
American economies are expected to grow by 1.3 per cent, after contracting 
marginally by 0.7 per cent in 2016.  
 
Figure 1 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies. The outlook overall continues to 
remain positive over the next two years, with the majority of experts adding 
upward revisions to forecasts for both the Euro Area and the United States. HM 
Treasury has not yet released forecasts for 2019, but between Oxford Economics, 
NIESR, IMF and OBR growth projections suggest an increase in 2019 of 1.8 per 
cent for the UK.  
 
FIGURE 1 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
         Euro Area           United States            United Kingdom 
  
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
In 2017, the Irish economy registered a 7.8 per cent annual increase in GDP. This 
growth was heavily influenced by the volatile nature of Irish trade balances. In 
Figure 2, the most recent quarter’s year-on-year growth rate of total Irish exports 
and imports reveal a 7.9 per cent increase in exports while imports fell 
dramatically by 8.4 per cent. Between 2016 and 2017, exports grew by 6.9 per 
cent while imports fell by 6.2 per cent. 
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FIGURE 2 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As noted in our previous Commentary, a useful way to observe Irish trade is by 
splitting values into three categories; cross-border goods trade, ownership goods 
trade and services trade. Cross-border goods represent approximately 35 per 
cent of total Irish exports but this share has been declining in recent years. 
Services trade represents the largest portion of Irish exports at roughly 40-45 per 
cent. The remaining category, ownership goods, captures the exchange of goods 
outside of Ireland’s borders that fall under Irish-resident firm ownership. This 
represented 8.3 per cent of total exports in 2013 before rising sharply to an 
average of 25 per cent over the last three years. The increase is mainly due to 
major multinational enterprises shifting certain functions to Ireland, resulting in 
manufacturing contracts being registered as Irish exports when these goods are 
both produced and sold abroad.  
 
The increase in exports is not evenly distributed between these three categories 
of trade. Cross-border exports of goods, a useful measure of domestic trade 
activity, increased annually by 2.4 per cent in 2017. Services exports rose by 12.6 
per cent, largely driven by increases in computer services which represent almost 
half of total services exports. Ownership trade, however, is estimated to have 
risen annually by 3.5 per cent, maintaining highly erratic annual growth rates per 
quarter ranging between -26.1 per cent and +32.2 per cent. Overall, the outlook 
for export growth remains quite volatile due to the nature of ownership trade.  
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Services represent over 60 per cent of total imports. Cross-border goods imports 
represent approximately 30 per cent of the total while ownership trade is far 
smaller under this measure at less than 10 per cent of total imports. A 6.9 per 
cent fall in services was the main factor behind the dramatic fall in Irish imports. 
Meanwhile, imported goods in 2017 rose annually by 3.7 per cent with respect to 
cross-border trade while ownership trade fell by an estimated 34.1 per cent. 
Declines in research and development as well as royalty/license fee payments 
were the major contributors towards service import declines. Figure 3 reveals net 
surpluses including adjustments for ownership trade. As of 2017, the growing 
influence of ownership trade significantly increases the headline figures for 
Ireland’s current trade balance.  
 
FIGURE 3 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
 
Figure 4 highlights the rise in 2015 in ownership trade, which had a dramatic 
effect particularly on the export of goods in Ireland. In terms of domestic activity, 
exports appear to have grown far more gradually than quarterly National 
Accounts would imply.  
 -
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FIGURE 4 GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY TYPE (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
 
Focusing on the components of cross border trade, exports of food and live 
animals increased by 12.5 per cent between 2016 and 2017. Medical and 
pharmaceutical product exports rose by 17.3 per cent between the same periods, 
netting an increase of €5.2 billion. Organic chemicals, however, saw the largest 
decline by €3.9 billion (-16 per cent). Medical and pharmaceutical product 
imports grew 41.2 per cent, increasing by €2.5 billion in 2017. Road vehicles and 
other transport equipment imports saw the largest combined decrease of €1.7 
billion (7 and 9.1 per cent respectively) between the same periods. In total, cross-
border exports increased by €2.85 billion with imports rising by €2.76 billion. 
Ireland’s composition of trade partners has further concentrated amongst the UK, 
the US, the Euro Area and China while trade with the rest of the world, both in 
terms of imports and exports, fell between 2016 and 2017. In particular, exports 
to China rose by 34.7 per cent largely through machinery and transport 
equipment, contributing to a trade surplus with China. This was due to continued 
rise in electrical machinery exports, which increased from €87.7 million in 2015 to 
€1.2 billion and €2.3 billion in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Imports from the US 
rose 11.9 per cent driven by chemicals and related product imports reaching a 
60.6 per cent growth rate. 
 
Computer services accounted for 48 per cent of Ireland’s total service exports in 
Q4 2017 and this category has increased persistently over the last number of 
years. Total service exports increased by 14.3 per cent in 2017. Royalties, licenses 
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and business service imports comprise 84 per cent of services imports according 
to our most recent quarterly data. In 2017, royalties/licenses fell annually by 1.4 
per cent while business service imports decreased by 16.1 per cent. Within the 
different business services, research and development saw the most dramatic 
decrease, falling by 43.1 per cent in 2017 (€20.3 billion). Increases in both royalty 
payments and research and technology are probably affected by the significant 
increase in the composition of the domestic capital stock accounted for by MNE 
intangible assets. The role of MNEs is also central to the 6.9 per cent decline in 
service imports.  
 
Ireland’s composition of trade partners between EU and non-EU members splits 
evenly in terms of service exports whereas 64 per cent of service imports are 
sourced from regions beyond the EU28 zone. In terms of annual rates of change, 
exports and imports to the EU28 remained relatively stable for Q3 2017. 
Annually, Ireland grew non-EU28 service exports by 20.2 per cent in Q3 2017 
while simultaneously lowering service imports by 25.8 per cent for the same 
period. Figure 5 illustrates how both exports and imports in the services industry 
have doubled since 2012. 
  
FIGURE 5 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
While shares of total trade are falling with respect to the UK, changes in these 
exports and imports for 2017 remain relatively stable as shown in Table 1 
compared with the previous year. Exports and imports of chemicals and related 
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products saw the largest changes, of 22 and 26 per cent respectively. There was 
also a significant increase in trade with the US within chemicals and related 
products (rising by 61 per cent), while there was relatively little growth overall 
with the rest of the EU for the same period.  
  
TABLE 1 ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR THE UK, THE US AND THE REST 
OF EU FOR MAJOR COMMODITIES 
 
Exports % Imports % 
Total – UK 8 10 
Food and live animals 8 7 
Chemicals and related products 22 26 
Machinery and transport equipment -3 1 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3 -1 
   
Total – Rest of EU 3 0 
Food and live animals 16 8 
Chemicals and related products 2 13 
Machinery and transport equipment 6 -8 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles -10 -2 
   
Total – US 4 12 
Food and live animals 16 -11 
Chemicals and related products 8 61 
Machinery and transport equipment -14 -9 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 11 2 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Given the highly volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as services, 
the forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based upon trends in trade 
patterns linked to underlying Irish economic activity. In Figure 6 we raise our 
2018 export forecast to 7.4 per cent growth while import is forecasted to grow by 
9.7 per cent. For 2019, exports and imports are expected to grow by 7.8 and 11 
per cent, respectively. We forecast a weaker trade balance in 2019 due to 
expected strong growth rates in private consumption, which will likely result in 
greater demand for imported goods and services.  
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FIGURE 6 IMPORT AND EXPORT GROWTH (2017-2019 FORECASTS) 
  
 
Source: QEC calculations. 
 
2017’s current account balance reached its highest level in 15 years at €37.1 
billion. The figure is largely the result of a uniquely positive balance in net 
services trade as well as an improvement in goods trade. Primary income, which 
is income from loans and investments, remained relatively steady in comparison. 
Figure 7 depicts the current account by its various categories of income flows.  
 
FIGURE 7 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, QUARTERLY (€ MILLION): Q1 2011 – Q4 2017 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
The official Irish growth rates indicated that the domestic economy increased by 
a substantial 7.8 per cent in 2017. However, as with growth rates in 2015 and 
2016, it is likely that the headline figure has been impacted by certain 
developments amongst a small number of multinational firms operating in the 
Irish jurisdiction. Therefore, it is very difficult to assess from the National 
Accounts what the rate of underlying activity in the Irish economy actually is. For 
example, investment and imports both registered highly volatile fluctuations 
throughout 2017. Figure 8 plots the year-on-year growth rates on a quarterly 
basis for both aggregates since 2009. The increased volatility in both series since 
2015 is readily apparent. 
 
FIGURE 8 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATES (%) OF IRISH INVESTMENTS AND IMPORTS: Q1 2009 – Q4 2017 
 
 
Sources:  QEC calculations for Ireland, AMECO estimates for all other countries. 
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Notwithstanding the new indicators which have and are about to be provided by 
CSO, it is time for a more ambitious project which seeks to produce National 
Accounts on a dual basis; one that captures developments in headline variables 
as per the ESA2010 definitions, and one that captures developments in the non-
multinational sector of the economy. FitzGerald (2015) has called for the 
preparation of National Accounts for the MNE and the non-MNE sector.5 
However, as noted in the investment section of the Commentary, it may not be 
sufficient to prepare National Accounts purely on this basis; information from the 
CSO Census of Industrial Production would suggest that large distortionary 
movements are also apparent for relatively small companies in the Irish economy 
i.e. ones that employ between ten and 49 people. Therefore, this argues for a 
more granular breakdown in the preparation of the National Accounts where 
firms with large distortionary transactions are excluded from a parallel set of 
accounts. This is required both for the output side of the National Accounts and 
on the expenditure side so that estimates of exports, imports and investment are 
also available. 
 
In this Commentary we have the first forecast for a period which occurs during 
Brexit i.e. the UK is set to leave the EU in March 2019. Following Bergin et al. 
(2016), we assume that Brexit will impact the Irish economy on a gradual basis 
over the medium term. Therefore, we do not expect any significant impact on our 
2019 forecasts. As with Bergin et al. (2016), our baseline technical assumption is 
that a European Economic Agreement (EEA) agreement will exist between the UK 
and the EU similar to that between Norway and the EU.6  
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
Trends in lending  
Figure 9 presents the annual growth rates of credit to households from Irish 
resident credit institutions. The data are split by loans for house purchase and 
other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). Overall, the 
change in credit for house purchase continues to decline, down -0.2 per cent 
year-on-year to Q3 2017. While the continued reduction in credit stocks indicates 
that deleveraging is still ongoing amongst households, the annual reduction of  
-0.2 per cent would suggest the process is slowing down. The expansion in the 
housing market and the increasing number of housing transactions is likely to see 
further increases in credit levels. 
 
                                                          
 
5
  FitzGerald, J., 2015. ‘Problems Interpreting the National Accounts in a Globalised Economy – Ireland’, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Summer 2015, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
6
  Bergin, A., A. Garcia Rodriguez, N. McInerney, E. Morgenroth and D. Smith, 2016. ‘Modelling the Medium to Long 
Term Potential Macroeconomic Impact of Brexit on Ireland,’ Working Paper WP548, Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI). 
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In Q3 2017, we observe an increase in the growth rate of lending for non-housing 
related household loans which are now up 5.5 per cent on a year-on-year basis. 
This represents a moderate decline in the rate of growth from 6.4 per cent in Q2 
2017. As these loans are mainly for consumption purposes and auto financing, 
the broader recovery in household spending is undoubtedly leading to an 
increase in demand for this type of financing. 
 
FIGURE 9 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
Turning to the provision of credit to Non-Financial Corporations, the overall stock 
of credit continues to decline, down by 9.7 per cent in Q3 2017 year-on-year 
which represents a marginal reduction in the pace of deleveraging from Q2 2017. 
However, when the financial and property related sectors are removed from the 
calculations, lending increased to the remaining sectors by 0.9 per cent in Q3 
2017. The difference between the trends in credit provision for corporates and 
credit to the non-construction ‘real economy’ shows that the legacy of the 
financial crisis still remains in certain sectors of the Irish economy.  
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FIGURE 10 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
 
A healthy credit market provides adequate volumes of appropriately priced credit 
at prudent loan conditions to firms and households. As the Irish economy 
continues to grow, it is important to monitor emerging trends in new lending 
from two perspectives: 1) that sufficient credit is flowing to ensure new 
investments can be made and 2) that lending activity does not begin to become 
unsustainable or imprudent.  
 
Using new mortgage lending data from the Banking and Payments Federation, in 
Q4 2017 the volume of new mortgage drawdowns increased by 13.5 per cent 
year-on-year, and the value of mortgages increased by 23 per cent year-on-year. 
The relatively higher growth rate in the value reflects the fact that borrowers are 
drawing down larger and larger loans given the increased house price 
environment. The average loan size for mortgages was €223,851 in Q4 2017 
which is 88 per cent of the peak value in Q1 2008. Indeed, the value of new 
drawdowns exceeded €2 billion in Q3 2017 for the first time since 2009, 
indicating the heightened level of activity in the credit market. In Q4 2017, the 
value of lending was €2.2 billion for the quarter.  
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FIGURE 11 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source: Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
Given the increased lending apparent, the policy framework governing credit 
provision is clearly very important if financial stability is to be ensured. In that 
regard, the macroprudential framework currently being deployed by the Central 
Bank, with prudent loan-to-income limits are central to sustainable credit 
provision. The description of the underlying mortgage loans published in Kinghan 
et al. (2017)7 suggests origination is currently not overly risky, with low average 
LTI and LTV. The recent changes to the macroprudential regulations, announced 
in November 2017, maintain the prudency of the overall framework. 
 
Another aspect of new lending that provides a guide to the health of the 
domestic economy is lending to small business. Loans to Irish small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) grew steadily in 2016 (Figure 12). This continues the 
trend in overall SME lending which began to increase in 2015 from mid-2014 
lows. 
 
Gross new lending was €1,058 million in Q3 2017, down from €1,121 million one 
year earlier. This represents a trend of declining new lending throughout 2017. 
Given the buoyancy of the recovery in the domestic economy, a decline in new 
lending for SMEs is difficult to reconcile. However, uncertainties potentially 
related to Brexit may be affecting credit demand in some sectors. 
 
 
                                                          
 
7
  Kinghan, C., P., Lyons, Y., McCarthy, and C., O’Toole, 2017. ‘Macroprudential Measures and Irish Mortgage Lending: 
Insights from H1 2017’, Economic Letters 13/EL/17, Central Bank of Ireland. 
-80.0
-60.0
-40.0
-20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
2006Q1 2007Q2 2008Q3 2009Q4 2011Q1 2012Q2 2013Q3 2014Q4 2016Q1 2017Q2
Volume of Total Drawdowns Value of Total Drawdowns
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Spr in g  201 8  |  17  
FIGURE 12 QUARTERLY NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (4-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE)  
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland  
 
Another sign of slightly deteriorating credit environment for SMEs is a rise in the 
rejection rates for Irish loans relative to European peers. Data from the ECB 
Survey on Access to Finance for SMEs (SAFE) provide a benchmark for rejection 
rates in Ireland relative to other European economies. These are presented in 
Figure 13. Following the financial crisis, rejection rates for Irish firms increased 
considerably, and were amongst the highest in the Eurozone. Since mid-2014 
rejection rates have been declining in Ireland relative to other countries and by 
early 2016 rates were well below the median in the Euro Area. The most recent 
data for end 2016 indicate a pickup in rejection rates and this has continued into 
the first half of 2017.  
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FIGURE 13 AVERAGE REJECTION RATE FOR BANK LOANS – IRISH AND EUROPEAN SMES 
 
 
Source:  ECB SAFE Survey. 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
A feature of the domestic recovery is that the cost of finance in Ireland for both 
corporate and household credit is high by European standards. More recently, 
competitive pressures are increasing in the mortgage market and some 
reductions in lending rates are occurring. The standard variable rate on new 
mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 3.32 per cent as of December 2017; this is 
down slightly year-on-year from 3.40 in December 2016. However, comparing 
Irish new house purchase loans relative to other Eurozone economies, it can be 
seen that new lending rates are the highest of the comparison group (Figure 14). 
As of December 2017, interest rates on new house purchase in Ireland were 
nearly 1.2 per cent higher than the median of the other countries presented. This 
gap has widened since mid-2014 when Irish interest rates began to decouple 
from the ECB policy rate. 
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FIGURE 14 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS  
– EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business SVR is only for new drawdowns.  
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 15 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for Non-Financial Corporations 
in Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 which is used as a 
proxy for loans for SMEs. In December 2017, the average rate on new loans for all 
Irish corporates was 2.83 per cent while the Eurozone average was 1.71 per cent. 
For small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in December 2017 was 5.29 per 
cent compared with a Eurozone average of 2.39 per cent. Interest rates are down 
year-on-year for small corporates but remain considerably higher than for their 
European peers.  
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FIGURE 15 INTEREST RATES ON LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
Household and firm deposits 
Central to understanding the financial position of households is information on 
their savings and investment behaviour. In this regard, the ESRI has, since 2010, 
compiled a monthly savings index, which examined how much households were 
saving as well as their attitudes to the savings environment.  
  
However, since October 2017, the ESRI has begun publishing a revised and 
updated Savings and Investment Index with Bank of Ireland that incorporates not 
only households’ savings activity but also their investment behaviour. This 
broader and more insightful index will further deepen our understanding of the 
financial position of households in Ireland. The most recent data from the Index 
indicate that households have increased savings rates in 2017 and feel 2018 is a 
good time to save. Households’ views on the investment environment have also 
improved which probably reflects the improved domestic economic situation and 
global growth buoyancy. Box 1 below provides more detail on the new Index. 
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BOX 1  MONITORING HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL DECISIONS – THE NEW BANK OF IRELAND/ESRI 
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT INDEX 
The Bank of Ireland/ESRI Savings and Investment Index tracks household attitudes 
towards savings and investment as well as monitoring their perspectives on the current 
and future savings and investment environment. Understanding savings behaviour 
provides insight into how households smooth consumption across economic cycles, plan 
for major purchases and build up buffers which can be drawn down in times of economic 
stress. Monitoring household investment patterns gives an understanding of how they 
are putting their money to work, their financial diversification, and their appetite for risk. 
The sample covers 800 consumers aged 16 years and above and is nationally 
representative. 
The Index is built on two pillars: A Savings Pillar and an Investment Pillar. The Savings 
Index is composed of two sub-indices: Savings Attitudes (savings behaviour and how 
respondents feel about the amount they save) and Savings Environment (perceptions of 
the current savings environment and expectations for the environment in six months).  
The new Investment Index mirrors the Savings Index with the survey looking at whether 
or not households invested in the following range of assets: stocks, pension plan, 
investment fund, bonds, property or other assets. These data are used, in conjunction 
with a question on whether or not households feel they are investing sufficiently, to 
create an Investment Attitudes Index. An Investment Environment Index is compiled 
based on questions about whether households think it is a good time to invest now or 
whether they expect it to be a good time in six months. These two elements are 
aggregated into an Investment Index. 
TABLE A  SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT INDEX 
Month 
Savings and 
Investment 
Index 
Savings Index Investment Index 
Overall Attitudes Environment Overall Attitudes Environment 
Nov-16   95.5 100.6 90.3   
 
  
Dec-16   90.2 91.2 89.2   
 
  
Jan-17   94.8 98.3 91.3   
 
  
Feb-17   89.2 87.4 91.0   
 
  
Mar-17   96.3 100.6 92.1   
 
  
Apr-17   92.9 95.8 90.0   
 
  
May-17   94.8 95.9 93.7   
 
  
Jun-17   90.4 91.7 89.2   
 
  
Jul-17   95.1 96.9 93.3   
 
  
Aug-17   89.9 94.3 85.5   
 
  
Sep-17   98.0 102.7 93.4   
 
  
Oct-17 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Nov-17 103.4 104.2 107.7 100.8 102.5 106.1 98.9 
Dec-17 101.9 102.7 107.7 97.6 101.2 104.2 98.2 
Jan-18 101.6 103.3 101.5 105.1 100.0 95.2 104.8 
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The Savings and Investment pillars are then averaged to provide an overall Savings and 
Investment Index. This broader and more insightful index will further deepen our 
understanding of the financial position of households in Ireland and explore what is 
driving their behaviour. 
In terms of recent trends in the Index, the monthly Savings and Investment Index 
remained flat at 102 points in January 2018 relative to December 2017. While there was 
a decrease in savings and investment attitudes, consumer’s views on the savings and 
investment environment improved. Respondent’s positive views on the savings and 
investments environment may be driven by two aspects: 1) continued improvement in 
Irish consumer finances and the labour market; 2) reduced global uncertainty and a 
better international trading environment. 
 
This box was prepared by Teresa Monteiro, Conor O’Toole, and Dorothy Watson. 
 
PRICES AND EARNINGS 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 0.4 per cent in 2017 having not 
changed in 2016. Figure 16 shows the relatively low inflation rate persisting since 
early 2013. The increase in overall prices within 2017 was mainly driven by 
inflation within housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (up 2.0 per cent on 
average), restaurants and hotels (up 2.9 per cent on average) and transport (up 
2.2 per cent). Compared to last year, price growth slowed in education as well as 
for goods such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco. 
 
Other goods in the economy continue to experience declines in prices. Prices fell 
by 4.3 per cent in clothing and footwear, having fallen by 2.4 per cent in the 
previous year. Furnishings, household equipment and routine household 
maintenance also experienced deflation, with prices down 4.2 per cent on the 
previous year. Prices for recreation and culture as well as for food and non-
alcoholic beverages both fell by 2.0 and 2.1 per cent, respectively. The 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) rose by 0.3 percentage points in 
2017, resulting in the Irish economy experiencing the lowest rate of inflation 
across the EU28. 
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FIGURE 16 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The difference in price trends between goods and services continues to widen as 
the economy moves into 2018. The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 17) 
indicate prices for services have averaged a 2.2 per cent increase in 2017 while 
the price of goods has fallen by 2.1 per cent. This follows an average 2.2 per cent 
rise in service prices and a 3.0 per cent fall in goods prices for 2016. Examining 
the CPI of goods in January 2018 reveals that prices have fallen to a level last seen 
in November 1999. Given our current forecasts of accelerated wage growth, 
increased private consumption expenditure and rising oil prices, it is expected 
that the disinflation experienced by certain goods will slow down through 2018.  
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FIGURE 17 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Fourth quarter earnings data from the CSO indicate that seasonally-adjusted 
Average Hourly Earnings increased by 0.2 per cent compared to the previous 
quarter. On an annual basis, earnings increased by 1.9 per cent up to €22.51. The 
largest increase for the quarter was observed in the professional, scientific and 
technical activities sector rising by 8.42 per cent (an additional €2.11 per hour) 
compared to the final quarter of the previous year. Other notable increases 
occurred in ICT and education, with earnings per hour rising by 4.6 per cent and 
4.4 per cent, respectively. Figure 18 highlights rising earnings occurring both on 
an hourly and weekly basis within 2017.  
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FIGURE 18  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER MONTH (€) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
Since Q2 2016, the growth of average weekly earnings has increased. If this trend 
continues, improvements in households’ earnings are likely over the short to 
medium term. After a substantial rise in Q1 2017, growth remained relatively 
slower for the remaining three periods. As of Q4 2017, the average weekly 
earnings reached €726.31, representing a 2 per cent increase from €711.91 in Q4 
2016. Increases in earnings should lead to continued consumption growth. 
 
When examining these trends further, strong differences emerge between 
different sectors of the economy. The largest gains in earnings over the last year 
occurred within the public administration and professional, scientific and 
technical activity sectors with weekly earnings rising, on average, by €38.99 and 
€30.70 respectively. After an annualised drop in construction sector earnings 
both in the second and fourth quarters of 2017, pay only saw a modest rise of 
€1.34 on average in that sector. Of the 13 sectors examined, arts and 
entertainment experienced the only decline for the overall year, with weekly 
earnings averaging a 0.6 per cent fall, equating to a €2.78 reduction. Figure 19 
presents a four-quarter moving average growth rate by sector to display the 
trends over time in earnings pressures. As of Q4 2017, a positive trend persists 
with overall earnings increasing by 2.3 per cent compared to the same period last 
year. The public administration sector exceeds this average, having emerged from 
a prolonged period of earnings reductions between 2013 and 2016. 
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FIGURE 19 FOUR-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE GROWTH BY SECTOR IN WEEKLY EARNINGS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Growth in employment appears to be contributing towards increased wage 
pressures in the Irish economy. In light of strong domestic demand and the 
continuously positive labour market performance, we expect both wages and 
prices to increase over the coming years. Furthermore, as Lawless and 
Morgenroth (2018) detail in their special article to this Commentary, the 
possibility of a hard Brexit in early 2019 may also add to price pressures on 
imported goods. Note a hard Brexit is different from the assumption made about 
Brexit in the Commentary for the 2019 forecast. Consumer prices are expected to 
increase moderately by 0.7 per cent in 2018, followed by 1.1 per cent in 2019. 
Earnings are forecast to rise by 2.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent for the same 
periods, meaning real wage growth is likely to continue rising as the economy 
approaches full employment levels. 
 
TABLE 2  INFLATION MEASURES 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 Annual % Change  
CPI 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.7 2.1 2.5 3.5 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
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DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Private consumption expenditure continues to benefit from the ongoing 
improvements in the labour market. The most up-to-date quarterly National 
Accounts show that, on an annualised basis, personal consumption expenditure 
increased by 2.8 per cent in Quarter 3, 2017 and 1.9 per cent in Quarter 4, 2017. 
On a quarter-on-quarter basis, consumption spending increased by 1.9 per cent 
and 0.3 per cent, respectively. The persistent fall in unemployment, increase in 
disposable incomes and an improvement in household balance sheets have all 
provided a supportive context for household spending. 
 
FIGURE 20  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT MARKET 
PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
An important leading indicator for consumption is developments in retail sales. 
These indicators provide a snapshot of what goods and services households are 
purchasing and where the growth is coming from. Table 3 presents retail sales for 
selected items in terms of the annual growth rate in the volume of sales. For all 
businesses retail sales are up 7.2 per cent in the year to December 2017. 
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TABLE 3 ANNUAL GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (DECEMBER 2017) 
Retail Business – NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
  Annual % change 
Motor trades 1.9 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores)  5.6 
Department stores  9.0 
Clothing, footwear and textiles 5.7 
Furniture and lighting 17.3 
Hardware, paints and glass 13.3 
Electrical goods 16.0 
All businesses excl. motor trades 7.6 
All businesses 7.2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The rise in consumer expenditures seems to be closely related to the recovery in 
the housing market. In the year to December 2017 there was a significant 
increase in furniture and lighting (up 16.1 per cent year-on-year), electrical goods 
(up 16.0 per cent year-on-year) and hardware, paints and glass (up 13.3 per cent 
year-on-year). The overall trends in retails sales are displayed in Figure 21. This 
chart presents a three-month rolling average of retail sales for total sales, sales 
excluding the motor trade, and for household equipment. Of note is the high 
growth in housing equipment (13.4 per cent in December) and the continued 
strength of all retail sales excluding the motor trade (7.4 per cent in December). 
As the construction sector continues to grow and housing transactions increase, it 
is likely that the sales of goods related to housing formation will maintain strong 
growth.  
 
FIGURE 21 AVERAGE GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), THREE- 
MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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As a complement to the retail sales data, it is salient to review trends in consumer 
sentiment. Figure 22 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which 
tracks the monthly views of households on their current and future economic 
perspectives. While international geopolitical factors were likely to have 
contributed to a weakening of consumer sentiment in mid to late 2016, from 
February 2017 to February 2018 the monthly index followed an overall positive 
trend. The three months moving average index reached its highest value in 
December 2017 (106.3 index points). One of the main drivers recently observed 
in the index was the strengthening of households’ views on their personal 
financial outlooks relative to 12 months ago. This suggests that economic growth 
is increasingly being felt by the wider population. The sentiment indicators 
correlate with the growth in average weekly earnings observed in the prices and 
earnings section of the Commentary.  
 
FIGURE 22 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
 
Irish household net worth continues to grow in Quarter 3, 2017 as loan 
repayments reduce the stock of outstanding liabilities and rising asset prices raise 
the total value of domestic balance sheets. The trend in the overall position of 
Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial and housing assets 
minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 23. Net worth decreased 
considerably during the financial crisis as housing assets fell sharply in value. The 
recovery in the housing market has contributed to a rise in housing wealth which 
has improved overall net worth. Financial assets have grown modestly since 
2010. As households continued to pay down debt balances, the liabilities side is 
continuing to decline. 
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FIGURE 23  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
In summary, household consumption is set to continue benefitting from elevated 
levels of consumer sentiment and an improved labour market over the next two 
years. We expect consumption expenditure to grow by 2.4 per cent this year and 
to grow at a slightly faster pace of 2.5 per cent in 2019.  
 
Property market developments 
The rate of increase in national property prices has been accelerating since the 
second half of 2016, reaching double digit growth rates in May 2017. Figure 24 
plots the year-on-year changes in residential property prices by property type. In 
January 2018 prices increased by 12.5 per cent year-on-year, the fastest growth 
rate in over two years. This compares with an increase of 9.0 per cent in the year 
to the end of 2016 and an increase of 8.8 per cent in the year to January 2017. 
Increased prices can be attributable to several factors including the country’s 
economic recovery and low interest rates, while policy measures such as the 
government help-to-buy scheme and the loosening of Central Bank lending rules 
have also increased demand-side pressures in the market. Nevertheless, property 
prices remain 22.3 per cent lower than the peak reached in May 2007. In the year 
to January 2018, the price of apartments grew year-on-year by 13.6 per cent.  
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FIGURE 24 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) BY DWELLING 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
House price developments are presented in Figure 25 on a geographic basis 
splitting out Dublin and the rest of Ireland. It is clear that the deceleration of price 
growth in Dublin in early 2015 was much more acute than outside the capital. 
Among other factors, this potentially reflects the fact that the Central Banks’ 
macroprudential rules in the housing market were more tightly binding for 
borrowers in the Dublin market who needed to use high loan-to-value and loan-
to-income ratios to purchase housing. Kinghan et al. (2017) provide some recent 
evidence of this. Furthermore, the looser loan-to-income cap for first time buyers 
purchasing properties less than €220,000 would have meant stricter limits in 
Dublin where average prices were higher. Prices in the rest of the country have 
been growing sharply, posting double digit growth every month since July 2016 
with one exception. The year-on-year growth rates have increased further in 
January 2018, with Dublin prices growing at 12.6 per cent and prices in the rest of 
the county increasing by 11.4 per cent. While the growth in house prices in Dublin 
has remained fairly stable over the past few months, the rate of apartment price 
growth has accelerated. In the rest of the country, house price growth has 
increased considerably while apartment price growth appears to have slowed 
down. 
 
In the 2018 Budget the Irish government announced the introduction of several 
measures in an effort to tackle the ongoing shortage of housing supply. Some of 
these measures include a doubling of the proposed vacant site tax levy (from the 
current 3 per cent to 7 per cent on land not sold by 2019), a new state-run 
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lending vehicle (Home Building Finance Ireland) which will provide finance at 
commercially competitive rates to viable developers and increased capital 
allocation towards social housing. 
 
According to government estimates, the €750 million allocated to the Home 
Building Finance Ireland has the potential to fund the construction of 6,000 
homes. The additional capital allocation of €500 million allocated to the Social 
Housing programme should enable local authorities and approved housing bodies 
to deliver approximately 50,000 new social houses by 2021 (3,800 in 2018).8 
 
These measures will help alleviate the undersupply of housing in Ireland; 
however as the supply of social housing has been below the required level over 
the past four to five years, there is a significant pent-up demand for this type of 
accommodation. 
 
FIGURE 25 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) BY REGION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
House price expectations can be gleaned from the ESRI/AIB House Price Index 
which is presented in Figure 26. The index, which comprises questions on 
attitudes to buying and selling property as well as expectations of house prices 12 
months from now, has started to trend upwards from the mid-point of 2016. This 
growth continued into Quarter 3 of 2017 while it slowed down in Quarter 4, 
2017. 
 
 
                                                          
 
8
  See rebuildingireland.ie. 
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In order to further understand the determinants of house price changes, the ESRI 
and AIB are reviewing the Housing Index with a view to publishing an improved 
and revised Index. It is expected that the new Index be published in Q2 2018 
covering the Q1 2018 period. 
 
FIGURE 26 ESRI/AIB HOUSE PRICE INDEX (BASE JULY 2013 = 100) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Irish real house prices rose at the fifth fastest pace among OECD countries in the 
third quarter of 2017, based on year-on-year growth. According to the OECD 
House Price Index (Figure 27), real house prices in Ireland grew at 18.6 per cent 
only being surpassed by Iceland (36.3 per cent), Canada (23.4 per cent), Hungary 
(20.4 per cent) and New Zealand (18.9 per cent). This is well above the average 
growth rates for the entire OECD (7.7 per cent) and Euro Area (6.1 per cent) and 
contrasts with housing market developments in countries such as Turkey (-2.7 per 
cent), Italy (-1.7 per cent) and Greece (-1.7 per cent).  
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FIGURE 27 OECD TOP TEN FASTEST GROWING HOUSING MARKETS, % GROWTH REAL HOUSE PRICES 
 
 
Source:  OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
National rents in Quarter 3, 2017 increased by 9.5 per cent on an annual basis, 
continuing the rise that has been observed since early 2013, as can be seen from 
Figure 28. Rents in Dublin had a steep increase in Quarter 3, 2017 of 9.9 per cent 
year-on-year, while rents in the Greater Dublin Area (excluding Dublin) and rents 
outside the Greater Dublin Area grew by 6.5 per cent and 9.2 per cent 
respectively for the same period. Since mid-2016 rents in Dublin are above the 
pre-crisis peak experienced in Quarter 4, 2007. As housing supply continues to be 
below the estimated structural demand, upward pressures in the rental market 
are expected to continue. 
 
FIGURE 28 RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD NATIONAL RENTAL INDEX (BASE Q3 2007 = 100), ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
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SUPPLY 
Investment 
Investment activity (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) in the most recent Quarterly 
National Accounts continues to display severe volatility. For the latest quarterly 
data available, Q4 2017, total investment increased by 6 per cent on a quarter-
on-quarter basis. This followed a quarterly decline of 35 per cent for Q3 2017 and 
a 32 per cent increase in Q2 2017. Investment in Q4 2017 was 40.1 per cent lower 
than the level in Q4 2016. The volatility is mainly driven by investment in 
intangible assets which fell by 67 per cent year-on-year to Q4 2017 but were up 9 
per cent quarter-on-quarter.  
 
Investment in machinery and equipment, which normally provides insight into 
how companies are building capital resources, is also displaying large changes. In 
Q4 2017, investment in machinery and equipment increased by 19 per cent 
quarter-on-quarter, having fallen by 16 per cent in the previous quarter. 
Investment in building and construction remains the single stable source of 
investment activity; investment in these assets grew by circa 4 per cent in Q3 and 
Q4 2017. 
 
FIGURE 29  COMPONENTS OF INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data (Table Annex 2B and 3B) – Chain linked annually and referenced to 
year 2015.  
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Such extreme fluctuations in aggregate investment are caused by the globalised 
nature of the Irish economy and the impact of multinational company activities. 
However, this poses a particular challenge to policymakers and researchers 
looking to understand the drivers of investment as well as understanding what 
capital assets are available to produce output in Ireland. 
 
As previously indicated, the CSO now provides an adjusted series for Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation on a quarterly basis, modified GFCF, which adjusts for the 
effects of trade in aircraft by aircraft leasing companies and the importation of 
intellectual property. The adjusted figures overall and for building and 
construction, intangibles and machinery and equipment are presented in Figure 
30.  
 
The adjusted data display a more normalised growth pattern with an upward 
trend evident from mid-2015 onwards. However, in the most recent period the 
growth rate reversed dramatically. Overall modified investment fell by 
approximately 6 per cent quarter-on-quarter as of Q4 2017. Intangible assets 
(excluding R&D related components) fell by 20 per cent quarter-on-quarter, while 
machinery and equipment (excluding aircraft leasing) fell by 16 per cent for the 
same period. 
 
FIGURE 30 MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data, Release Annex Table 4E.  
 
Therefore, there is a still a challenge in measuring and understanding investment 
by domestic firms whose plans and patterns are most aligned to developments in 
the domestic economy, in particular domestic SMEs. A recent proposal by the 
CSO to provide figures excluding some of the large multinationals in national 
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accounting terms is very welcome. However, given the fact that many foreign 
owned-firms in Ireland have a small number of employees (for example brass 
plate companies), any new data must ensure that an investment series accurately 
captures decisions by real productive firms in the domestic economy. No current 
data series exists that can accurately measure investment by domestic SMEs. 
Indeed, recent research by Lawless et al. (2018) would suggest that domestic 
SMEs are underinvesting at present. 9 For example, consider the data below taken 
from the CSO Census of Industrial Production which profiles investment across 
firm sizes for industrial companies. 
 
TABLE 4  ADDITIONS TO CAPITAL ASSETS – TOTAL (€ ‘000) BY PERSONS ENGAGED AND YEAR 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0-9 203,137 300,842 1,087,851 928,392 337,205 
10-49 380,580 251,770 386,112 452,327 24,900,982 
50-249 908,002 1,057,201 806,604 905,901 1,996,635 
250 and over 4,211,731 4,447,978 5,485,614 7,382,312 8,773,512 
 
Source:  CSO Census of Industrial Production. 
 
It can be seen that between 2014 and 2015, additions to capital assets 
(investment) increased from approximately €0.5 billion to €24.9 billion in 2015, 
for companies with 10-49 employees. Clearly, such a dramatic increase in the 
value of capital assets is unlikely to be reflective of real underlying activity in the 
Irish economy. This indicates that merely controlling for employee numbers is not 
sufficient grounds for removing distorting, multinational-related activity from the 
National Accounts. 
 
Therefore, any resulting series which purports to accurately reflect the scale of 
underlying investment in the Irish economy must be based on information from 
enterprises which exclude the types of brass-plated firms mentioned above. 
 
To capture the more current expectations of enterprises in relation to their 
investment plans, the Markit Purchasing Manager’s Index provides another 
indicator of activity in the manufacturing, services and construction sectors. It is 
shown in Figure 31. A reading above 50 indicates an expansion and, in the first 
few months of 2017, we can see that the index is beginning to trend upwards for 
construction and remains well above 50 for manufacturing and services. The most 
recent data for January 2018 suggest the construction sector is growing quickly 
and has a more bullish outlook. While manufacturing and services firms posted 
 
                                                          
 
9
  Lawless, M., C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker, 2018. ‘Estimating an SME investment gap and the contribution of financing 
frictions’, ESRI Working Paper series, Series Number 589. 
38 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Sp r i ng  20 18   
positive expectations towards the end of 2017, this expectation is somewhat 
more muted in January 2018. 
 
FIGURE 31 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
For both manufacturing and services activity the most recent October 2017 data 
for purchasing activity indicate a softening, and levelling out, of forward looking 
purchasing behaviour.  
 
FIGURE 32 FORWARD LOOKING INDICATORS FOR PURCHASING ACTIVITY  
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
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The quarterly National Accounts point to a continued expansion of investment 
activity in construction. Underpinned by strong housing demand and a supportive 
policy context, we expect housing completions to grow strongly this year. We 
expect housing completions (as measured by electricity connections) to be 
approximately 19,271 units for 2017, broadly in line with our forecasts. For 2018, 
we forecast an increase to 24,000 units, growing again to 29,500 in 2019. 
 
FIGURE 33 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2018-2019 FORECASTS) – TO 2017 ACTUAL 
 
 
Source:  Department of Environment and QEC Forecasts. 
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Unemployment 
Given the continuing strong performance of the Irish economy in 2017, the 
number of people out of work continued to decline throughout the year. On a 
seasonally-adjusted basis the Live Register recorded a monthly decrease of 3,500 
(-1.4 per cent) in December 2017, resulting in a seasonally-adjusted total of 
241,000 people out of work. This represents an annual decrease of 40,800 (-14.5 
per cent). Initial figures for 2018 show the positive trends continuing for the 
labour market. In January 2018 the number of people out of work was reduced 
further by 3,000 (-1.2 per cent) relative to December 2017. As can be seen from 
Figure 34, the number of persons on the Live Register in January 2018 (238,400) 
is still above the 2007 lowest level (156,300) but well below the 2011 peak 
(448,700).  
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FIGURE 34 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: MONTH 1, 2006 TO MONTH 1, 2018 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The share of long-term unemployed represented 41.3 per cent of total 
unemployment in January 2018 compared to 43.1 per cent in January 2017. 
While short-term unemployment had the largest decline in the Live Register 
during the initial phase of the economic recovery, since mid-2015 long-term 
unemployment is registering the largest reduction. On a yearly basis, long-term 
unemployment fell by 17.8 per cent in January 2018 and short-term 
unemployment fell by 11.6 per cent. 
 
In terms of the last occupation held by those on the Live Register, Table 5 
summarises the annual change between 2017 and 2018. 
 
TABLE 5  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY LAST HELD OCCUPATION 
Sector M01 2017 M01 2018  % Change 
Managers and administrators 13.1 11.6 -11.3 
Professional 16.0 14.0 -13.0 
Associate professional and technical 8.6 7.7 -10.2 
Clerical and secretarial 27.9 24.7 -11.5 
Craft and related 50.6 42.0 -17.0 
Personal and protective services 36.8 32.2 -12.7 
Sales 29.2 24.3 -16.7 
Plant and machine operatives 44.5 37.3 -16.0 
Other broad occupational groups 33.3 29.2 -12.2 
No occupation 16.9 14.3 -15.0 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Notwithstanding the recent pick-up in the construction sector, the occupational 
group with the largest number of people on the Live Register is still the craft and 
related sectors. However, this sector did register the largest decrease over the 
past year. 
 
In Quarter 2, 2017 the CSO discontinued the Quarterly National Household 
Survey (QNHS) and in Quarter 3, 2017 introduced the new Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), a redesigned questionnaire with enhancements to the survey methodology. 
Furthermore, the CSO also updated the labour market data to incorporate the 
results from the most recent Census 2016. The working-age population estimate 
for Q2 2016 based on the Census 2011 was 3.64 million while the new figure 
based on Census 2016 is 3.73 million. As a consequence of these changes, several 
statistics were revised in the January 2018 LFS publication, while there has been a 
delay in the publication of other labour related statistics. Overall, historic 
estimates of the labour force, employment and unemployment were revised 
upwards in the LFS when compared with similar statistics from the QNHS.  
 
The LFS data adjustment resulted in an upward revision of the unemployment 
rate of about 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points. According to the new data, the 
seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate at the end of 2017 was 6.2 per cent. This 
compares with a revised rate of 7.5 in December 2016. In 2018, on a month-to-
month basis, the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell to 6.1 per cent in 
January and to 6.0 per cent in February 2018. The figure is down from 7.3 per 
cent in February 2017. 
 
FIGURE 35 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
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Employment 
The seasonally-adjusted figures for employment in the Irish economy continue to 
increase with 66,800 jobs being added in the year to the fourth quarter of 2017 
(+3.1 per cent), bringing the number of persons in employment to 2,231,000. The 
largest year-on-year growth rates were recorded in the administrative and 
support service activities (+15.0 per cent), construction (+9.5 per cent) and the 
accommodation and food service activities (+8.7 per cent) sectors.  
 
After a period of continued growth, employment in the Irish economy is 
approaching its previous 2007 peak level (2,228,700). Nevertheless, there has 
been a change in the composition of employment since the boom years. 
Employment in the construction sector remains 42.6 per cent below its peak level 
and employment in the information and communication sector is up by 33.1 per 
cent over the same period. Employment in administrative and support services 
was also particularly hit by the crisis and still remains significantly below its peak 
level. Employment in education services, on the other hand, seems to have grown 
significantly over the past years.  
 
Overall, the Irish economy seems to be moving in the direction of full 
employment. Nonetheless, to meet the growing demand for commercial and 
residential property, employment in the construction sector will need to increase 
somewhat over the medium term. Migration inflows from other EU countries are 
likely to be an important source of future labour supply in the Irish economy. 
 
TABLE 6  PERSON AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER IN EMPLOYMENT (‘000), NACE REV 2 ECONOMIC SECTOR, 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
  Q4 2007 Q4 2017 Q4 2007 – Q4 2017 % 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  116.2 113.7 -2.2 
Industry and Construction  533.6 417.5 -21.8 
Industry  300.4 283.7 -5.6 
Construction  233.2 133.8 -42.6 
Services  1,578.9 1,684.5 6.7 
Accommodation and food service 141.9 168.0 18.4 
Information and communication  86.9 115.7 33.1 
Administrative and support 103.6 98.0 -5.4 
Education  136.3 164.8 20.9 
Other 1,110.2 1,138.0 2.5 
Not stated 8.5 9.4 10.6 
Total 2,228.7 2,215.7 -0.6 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
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Another sign that the economy is continuing to perform strongly is that more 
workers are moving from part-time to full-time employment. In the fourth 
quarter of 2017, full-time (non-seasonally-adjusted) employment increased by 
90,100 (+5.4 per cent) year-on-year to 1,770,100. Full-time employment now 
accounts for 81.2 per cent of total employment, this compares with 81.3 per cent 
in the 2007 peak and 74.8 per cent in the 2012 downturn. On the other hand, 
part-time employment fell by 23,300 (-4.8 per cent) to 460,900 and accounts for 
20.7 per cent of total employment. 
 
The shift in the structure of the Irish labour market can also be observed in 
changes in the educational attainment level of those in employment, as displayed 
in Table 7. A clear pattern is evident with the proportion of people with third-
level education increasing significantly while the share of those with lower 
secondary education or below decreasing over the past decade (proportions in 
terms of labour force participation are fairly similar). 
 
TABLE 7  PERSON AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER IN EMPLOYMENT BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, APPROXIMATE 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
2003 2007 2017 
Lower secondary or below 28.0 23.5 12.3 
Upper secondary 27.6 27.7 23.9 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 12.2 10.8 13.2 
Third-level non-honours degree 11.2 11.3 18.2 
Third-level honours degree or higher 18.8 22.9 29.2 
Other 2.1 3.8 3.3 
 
Sources:  QNHS, Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  There was a break in the QNHS statistics in Q1 2014, therefore these percentages represent an approximation. 
 
Despite the recovery of the Irish economy and the improved performance of the 
labour market, the labour market participation rate remains below its 2007 peak 
level. The overall seasonally-adjusted participation rate in the fourth quarter of 
2017 is at 62.3 per cent, 4.4 percentage points lower than in the first quarter of 
2007. In fact, the overall participation rate has remained broadly flat since 2011 
and is at the same level as the participation rate in the early 2000s. Male 
participation rates, in particular, seem not to have recovered (68.9 per cent in Q4 
2017), and remain 7.9 percentage points below the peak in the first quarter of 
2007. Despite being 0.8 percentage points below the 2007 peak, female 
participation rates in the fourth quarter of 2017 (55.9 per cent) are 6.2 
percentage points above the participation rates in the first quarter of 2000 (49.7 
per cent). Although male participation rates remain well above female rates, they 
have followed different trends since the beginning of the century. The upward 
pattern in female participation rates is associated with a fall in the proportion of 
females engaged exclusively in home duties, which are not considered in the 
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labour force statistics. Furthermore, the rising levels of educational attainment 
are also likely to be associated with the increase in female labour force 
participation. 
 
FIGURE 36 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED PARTICIPATION RATES, 15 YEARS AND OVER (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
A growing share of young people enrolled in third-level education and a slightly 
greater proportion of retirees might have contributed to a fall in the labour force. 
However, there still seems to be some potential for an increase in labour force 
participation as the economy continues to expand. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
The continuing strong performance of the Irish economy and the recovery of the 
construction sector should contribute to a further reduction in the 
unemployment rate. Given the latest review of the CSO labour market figures, we 
believe that the unemployment rate will average 5.4 per cent through 2018 and 
4.5 per cent through 2019. Employment is set to exceed 2.27 million by the end 
of 2018 and increase to 2.30 million by the end of 2019. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
2017 saw Irish taxation receipts in total increase by over 6 per cent. This came on 
top of annual increases in 2014, 2015 and 2016 of 9, 10 and 4 per cent 
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respectively. Figure 37 illustrates the annual changes in taxation returns for the 
last four years for the main tax categories as well as the overall total amount. 
 
FIGURE 37 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%)  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
VAT receipts registered strong increases in 2017 at 7 per cent, which followed an 
increase of almost 4 per cent in 2016. This coupled with the consistent increases 
in pay related social insurance (PRSI) of 3.5 per cent in both 2016 and 2017, which 
implies increases in disposable incomes, illustrates the importance of domestic 
consumption to the present economic performance. 
 
Given developments in Irish public finances it is timely again to look at the 
composition of taxation receipts. In Figure 38, the contribution of different 
taxation items to overall receipts is plotted for the period 2000 to 2017. 
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FIGURE 38 CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT TAXATION AGGREGATES TO OVERALL RECEIPTS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
A number of trends are evident from the graph; first in the run up to 2007, 
income tax, excise duty and corporation tax all experienced declines in their 
contribution to overall receipts. However, since then, income tax and more 
recently corporation tax’s share of receipts have increased quite significantly. 
From Figures 39 and 40, it would appear that the taxation base has become more 
concentrated and more volatile.10 However, this is because taxation receipts are 
increasingly coming from income taxation, which is a relatively stable source of 
revenue. While the taxation base prior to 2007 may have been more diversified, 
some of the taxation headings such as stamps and VAT were very much 
associated with receipts from the housing sector, which ultimately proved to be 
quite unstable. Therefore, post-2008, an increasing proportion of taxation 
revenues are coming from a smaller number of sources (such as income tax), 
which are relatively more stable. 
 
What this suggests is that relying purely on standard metrics to assess the 
stability or otherwise of a country’s tax base may not always reveal the true 
underlying situation. As noted in Addison Smyth and McQuinn (2016; 2010),11 to 
get a more comprehensive assessment of stability, the individual taxation 
aggregates should be examined in terms of their underlying determinants. 
 
                                                          
 
10
  The Herfindahl Index is a standard measure of concentration, in this case highlighting how concentrated total tax 
revenue has become with respect to income tax. As the index falls, sources of tax revenue become more diversified 
and hence less prone to major volatility as a result of specific risks linked to particular tax components.   
11
  Addison Smyth, D. and K. McQuinn, 2016. ‘Assessing the sustainable nature of housing-related taxation receipts: the 
case of Ireland’, Journal of European Real Estate Research, Vol. 9 (2), pp. 193-214. 
Addison Smyth, D. and K. McQuinn, 2010. ‘Quantifying revenue windfalls from the Irish housing market, The 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41 (2), pp. 201-223. 
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FIGURE 39 HERFINDAHL INDEX OF IRISH TAXATION AGGREGATES 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
FIGURE 40 COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF IRISH TAXATION AGGREGATES 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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One issue of concern in terms of recent taxation developments is the increase in 
corporation tax receipts. Given the issues with the National Accounts and the 
implications of large transactions by a relatively small number of multinationals, 
the concern is that all of the recent, strong increase in corporation tax receipts 
may not be sustainable. The concern is further reinforced by the latest analysis 
from the Revenue Commissioners (Tancred, 2017)12 which indicates that in 2016, 
just ten firms accounted for almost 40 per cent of the total corporation tax take. 
In the absence of individual firm data, it is very difficult to assess the stability or 
otherwise of such developments. In Figure 41, corporation tax receipts and a HP 
filtered series are plotted over the period 1995 to 2017 – the HP filtered series is 
used to proxy for a long-run average value of receipts. The graph suggests that 
recent increases constitute a return to the very strong growth rates experienced 
in corporation taxes over the period 1995-2007. Corporation taxes fell during the 
period of the international financial downturn; however, since 2015 they have 
been increasing at a significant pace and in line with long-run trends.  
 
FIGURE 41 CORPORATION TAX RECEIPTS: 1995 – 2017 (€000 MILLION) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
One particular source of uncertainty concerning corporation tax receipts is recent 
proposed changes in US tax legislation. New potential changes mean that it is less 
attractive for US firms to locate valuable intellectual property assets in countries 
outside of the US, as these assets are now more likely to be subject to US tax 
rates. This move accompanies the recent proposal to reduce the US corporation 
tax rate from 35 to 20 per cent. 
 
                                                          
 
12
  Tancred, P., 2017. ‘An Analysis of 2015 Corporation Tax Returns and 2016 Payments’, Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners, Statistics and Economic Research Branch, April 2017. 
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Due to the strong increases in taxation revenues experienced particularly during 
the latter course of 2017, we now expect a mild deficit of -0.3 per cent in 2017. 
Our forecasts suggest that the public finances will experience a surplus of 0.2 and 
0.6 per cent in 2018 and 2019, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 42 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Figure 42 presents the debt-to-output ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* 
measure. While both trends indicate that Ireland’s debt sustainability is clearly 
improving, a significant difference in the two ratios is evident due to the 
difference in the GDP and GNI* output denominators. 
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General Assessment 
 
As we move into the first quarter of 2018 the Irish economy continues to show 
signs of strong momentum; the unemployment rate is now below 6 per cent and 
overall taxation receipts in the economy continue to grow on top of significant 
increases in previous years. While underlying concerns about the UK economy 
still persist, in general, the performance of the Irish economy’s main trading 
partners suggests strong external demand for domestically produced goods and 
services. This, allied with persistent increases in consumption and underlying 
investment, indicates another robust performance by the Irish economy is likely 
in 2018. Our initial estimates for growth in 2019 suggest the Irish economy will 
grow at a significant rate for the seventh year in a row, indicating that in terms of 
the headline variables, the economy will have recovered from the post-
2007/2008 international financial downturn. It is increasingly clear that the main 
macroeconomic policy challenge over the coming 18 months will be to ensure 
that the growth enjoyed by the economy is sustainable over the medium term. 
This will almost certainly entail the relevant authorities displaying restraint in 
terms of both fiscal and macroprudential policy.  
 
It now seems apparent that in 2017 the global economy grew at its fastest pace in 
six years. Loose monetary conditions are now sustaining business activity, while 
the lingering impact from budget austerity is dissipating. Both the US and China 
registered stronger than expected growth towards the end of 2017 while the 
Euro Area registered the strongest annual growth in over six years in the same 
quarter. European growth is now benefitting from a healthy labour market, 
dynamic exports and loose monetary policy. Concerns about the UK economy 
persist into 2018; overall there are mixed messages with consumer and business 
sentiment subdued while the labour market continues to see relatively low rates 
of unemployment. Most commentators feel that growth will moderate this year, 
particularly as investment continues to be adversely impacted by uncertainty due 
to Brexit. Agreeing swiftly on a transition period will be vital to providing 
certainty to firms and safeguarding investment in the UK. As noted previously, 
any protracted slowdown in the UK economy will have direct, negative 
implications domestically. 
 
The upbeat assessment of the domestic performance comes when the Irish 
National Accounts continue to show a high degree of unpredictability. Given the 
variability in key economic variables such as output, investment and the terms of 
trade it is particularly difficult to generate reliable and timely estimates of the 
output gap with the present set of National Accounts. The reasons for the 
variability are understood; in light of the ESA2010 accounting standards being 
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adopted, a small open economy such as Ireland’s which depends on high levels of 
net inward multinational investment will see significant fluctuations in certain 
variables. While work has been underway to produce ancillary information such 
as the GNI* concept and related variables, a more ambitious exercise, which 
would see the preparation of two sets of National Accounts, is required. The aim 
would be to provide a parallel set of National Accounts where firms with large 
distortionary transactions are excluded. As a national priority, resources must be 
provided for this important work. 
 
The new National Development Plan and the National Planning Framework may 
also pose challenges in terms of sustainable fiscal policy over the medium term. 
The plan outlines an ambitious €116 billion programme for investment of public 
capital over the coming years. The following strategic investment areas are 
prioritised: Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, rural development, 
environmentally sustainable public transport, airports and ports, water 
infrastructure, the road network, enterprise skills and innovation capacity, 
culture, sport and heritage, climate action and education, health and childcare.  
 
While it is not the function of this Commentary to provide a robust review of the 
specificities of a very wide ranging capital plan, from a macro-economic 
perspective it is worth highlighting a number of points. The current rapid growth 
in the economy suggests the possibility of capacity constraints in the domestic 
economy over the coming years, particularly in the labour market. Within this 
context, it is prudent to ensure that every large public capital project is assessed 
in detail and is subject to critical and thorough cost-benefit appraisals: Jenkinson 
et al. (2018) outline a broad capacity and demand analysis for infrastructure 
developments.13 Additionally, however, a continuing macroeconomic assessment 
of the impact of the plan on prices, wages and other channels would also be 
important.  
 
Another issue of note on the public finances front is the sustainability or 
otherwise of the current level of corporation tax receipts. As noted in the public 
finances section, corporation taxes have been rising sharply over the last three 
years. In 2017, corporation taxes accounted for over 16 per cent of total taxation 
revenues of the State – the first time since 2003. While the strong growth rates in 
recent years undoubtedly reflect the improved corporate profitability including 
that of multinational firms operating in the Irish market, the increased 
concentration of the receipts amongst a relatively small number of companies 
does give rise to issues of sustainability. This concern is further compounded by 
recent taxation changes in the United States. In particular, under these reforms, 
 
                                                          
 
13
  Jenkinson, F., D. O’Callaghan, P. Reidy, F. Kane and S. Prior, 2017 ‘Strategic Public Infrastructure: Capacity and 
Demand Analysis’, Staff Papers 2017, Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES). 
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valuable intellectual property assets principally held by US companies would be 
subject to tax treatment in the US initially; a move which would make it less 
attractive to locate these assets in Ireland. This change comes on top of proposals 
to reduce the US corporation tax rate from 35 to 20 per cent. Therefore, the 
present uncertainty concerning corporation taxes is another reason for discipline 
on the public finances front. 
 
The past quarter has seen the launch of the new ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings and 
Investment Index. Monteiro, O’Toole and Watson in a box in the Commentary 
provide an overview of the Index in terms of what it seeks to capture and some 
preliminary results. The Index tracks household attitudes towards savings and 
investment as well as monitoring their perspectives on the current and future 
savings and investment environment. Understanding savings behaviour provides 
insight into how households smooth consumption, plan to make big purchases 
and build up buffers which can be drawn down in times of economic stress. 
Monitoring household investment patterns gives an understanding of how they 
are putting their money to work, their financial diversification, and their appetite 
for risk. The Index also provides a Risk Barometer and a Retirement Optimism 
Index to give insight into household risk-taking and retirement planning. These 
will be presented on alternate months. Information from the Index along with the 
other indices assessing general market sentiment and housing sentiment 
produced by the Institute are increasingly useful in providing timely assessments 
of consumer intentions in the Irish economy.  
 
Finally, the ongoing uncertainty concerning the UK Government’s stance on 
remaining in the EU Customs Union is of particular relevance to the Irish 
economy. The implications for domestic consumer prices of new tariffs between 
the UK and Irish economy are examined in a Special Article to the Commentary. 
Lawless and Morgenroth examine the contribution of UK imports to overall 
household expenditure in Ireland and their exposure to tariffs and other cost 
increases from possible restrictions on trade. They estimate that the imposition 
of such tariffs could increase the annual cost of the typical consumption basket 
for the average household between €892 (increase in non-tariff trade costs) and 
€1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases). Lawless and Morgenroth also find 
that households with lower income levels would face considerably higher 
percentage increases as they tend to consume a higher share of products that 
would be most affected by increases in tariffs and trade costs. Along with the 
estimated impact of a hard Brexit on Irish fiscal space in Garcia (2017), this 
represents another tangible example of how a hard Brexit would impact the 
domestic economy. 
 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 194.1 0.9 2.9 195.8 4.1 3.1 203.9 5.9 3.3 215.8 
Tourism 4.7 5.1 3.8 4.9 3.0 3.0 5.1 3.2 3.2 5.2 
Other Services 136.3 13.8 13.3 155.1 14.2 13.4 177.1 14.4 13.5 202.7 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 6.1 6.9 335.8 8.5 7.4 386.1 9.8 7.8 423.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     -0.2     -0.2     -0.2 
Adjusted Exports 335.0 6.1 6.94 335.6 8.5 7.4 385.9 9.8 7.8 423.5 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 6.5 26.4 16.0 8.2 10.4 20.2 9.0 7.8 20.3 9.7 
Other Building 10.3 22.3 18.7 12.6 26.6 20.0 15.9 28.7 22.0 20.5 
Transfer Costs 1.1 0.9 -1.1 1.1 9.2 3.0 1.2 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 17.7 30.2 15.8 23.0 19.6 18.7 27.6 20.6 20.2 33.3 
Machinery and Equipment 70.0 -33.6 -31.5 46.4 13.8 10.1 52.8 13.9 10.2 60.2 
Total Investment 87.7 -20.8 -22.3 69.5 15.7 12.6 80.4 16.2 13.3 93.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.2 2.0 0.1 3.3 2.5 0.1 3.4 1.4 0.0 3.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 80.3 5.2 4.2 84.4 5.3 4.5 88.9 5.4 4.8 93.7 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 26.4 15.3 4.0 30.4 5.2 1.6 32.0 11.9 3.8 35.8 
Total Income Received 109.9 7.5 8.3 118.1 5.2 6.1 124.3 7.0 8.7 132.9 
Current Transfers 23.6 -1.5 -0.4 23.2 -6.7 -1.6 21.7 -2.4 -0.5 21.1 
Gross Personal Income 133.4 5.9 7.9 141.3 3.2 4.6 145.9 5.6 8.1 154.1 
Direct Personal Taxes 29.4 4.1 1.2 30.6 3.8 1.2 31.7 3.4 1.1 32.8 
Personal Disposable Income 104.1 6.4 6.7 110.8 3.1 3.4 114.2 6.2 7.1 121.3 
Consumption 96.6 3.2 3.1 99.7 3.4 3.4 103.1 3.5 3.6 106.8 
Personal Savings 7.5 48.2 3.6 11.0 0.1 0.0 11.1 31.0 3.4 14.5 
Savings Ratio 7.2 
  
10.0   9.7   11.9 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.0 
  
21.6   22.6   21.2 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 88.2 -7.2 -4.3 81.9 11.3 9.0 91.1 9.9 11.0 100.1 
Tourism 5.6 4.3 2.8 5.9 4.5 3.0 6.1 5.6 4.0 6.5 
Other Services 180.6 -4.3 -7.1 172.8 14.7 10.3 198.1 15.8 11.3 229.3 
Imports of Goods and Services 274.4 -5.1 -6.2 260.5 13.4 9.7 295.4 13.7 11.0 335.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
-0.4   -0.5   -0.5 
Adjusted Imports 274.4 -4.9 -6.2 260.9 13.4 9.7 295.8 13.7 11.0 336.5 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 355.6 385.8 423.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 274.4 260.5 295.4 335.9 
Net Factor Payments -47.6 -53.8 -56.5 -58.7 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.3 -4.8 -5.3 
Balance on Current Account 9.2 37.1 29.4 23.7 
As a % of GNP 4.1 15.4 11.7 9.0 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 113.3 110.6 114.7 114.7 
Industry 394.7 411.6 427.0 437.8 
Of which: Construction 118.9 128.4 140.1 148.3 
Services 1,618.2 1,664.9 1,712.0 1,745.4 
Total at Work 2,133.3 2,194.5 2,253.7 2,298.0 
Unemployed 194.8 157.8 128.5 107.6 
Labour Force 2,327.9 2,353.3 2,382.2 2,405.6 
Unemployment Rate, % 8.4 6.7 5.4 4.5 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Article 
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BREXIT AND IRISH CONSUMERS1  
Martina Lawless and Edgar Morgenroth* 
ABSTRACT 
Concerns about the impact of Brexit on the Irish economy have tended to focus 
on the challenges to exporting firms. However, as the UK is a significant source of 
imports into the Irish economy and there is considerable integration of the retail 
sectors in both countries, the imposition of tariffs or other increases in trading 
costs could pass through to increased prices for Irish consumers. This paper 
examines the contribution of UK imports to overall household expenditure in 
Ireland and their exposure to tariffs and other cost increases from possible 
restrictions on trade. Our approach generates an estimate of potential increases 
in the level of CPI of between 2 per cent and 3.1 per cent. In the estimated 
scenarios, these increases are the equivalent of between €892 (increase in non-
tariff trade costs) and €1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases) in the annual 
cost of its consumption basket for the average household. This assumes that 
there is no switching or changes in expenditure patterns in response to the cost 
increases so gives an upper bound to the cost increase effects. We also find that 
these effects are very unevenly distributed across households. Households with 
lower income levels would face considerably higher percentage increases as they 
tend to consume a higher share of products that would be most affected by 
increases in tariffs and trade costs.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the decision of the UK government to leave the EU there has been 
significant evidence put forward that the potential introduction of trade barriers 
could impact negatively on Irish exporters and on the Irish economy overall. One 
further channel through which Brexit could impact on Ireland that has received 
less attention so far is though price increases on imports. The UK is a significant 
source of imports into the Irish economy with 28 per cent of Irish goods imports 
originating in the UK in 2016 as compared to the UK accounting for 14.6 per cent 
of Irish goods exports. Irish consumers and Irish firms could therefore face 
significant price increases in the event of tariffs being applied to these products. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1
  This work was funded by the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and we would like to thank John 
Shine and Geoffrey Grey for their helpful comments. 
* Dr Edgar Morgenroth is Professor of Economics at Dublin City University Business School. This report was completed 
while he was an Associate Research Professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute and an Adjunct Professor 
at Trinity College Dublin.  
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The potential effect of Brexit on consumer prices was highlighted in the early 
scoping study prior to the referendum undertaken by Barrett et al. (2015). This 
raised a concern about the high level of Irish imports sourced in the UK and that 
the integrated nature of retail sectors could result in the exposure of households 
to increased prices and, also on a wider scale, that this could have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of the Irish economy and raise prices for 
consumers.  
 
Brexit may impact on consumer prices through a number of channels. Firstly, 
Brexit has already impacted significantly on the Sterling/Euro exchange rate and 
these changes have an impact on import prices and consumer prices. A large 
literature has considered the degree to which exchange rate changes pass 
through to prices. This has found that exchange rate changes are typically not 
completely passed through to prices and depends on the market structure (see 
Auer and Schoenle, 2016). For Ireland, Morgenroth (2000) showed that while 
exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on Irish exports to the UK in the 
short-run, the long-run impact is zero. More recent evidence by Reddan and Rice 
(2017) found that only 10 per cent of the exchange rate change is passed through 
to consumer prices in Ireland. 
 
Secondly, if Brexit results in increased trade barriers between the UK and the EU 
then this is likely to reduce competition in the Irish market from abroad, and 
lower competition allows local firms to charge higher prices. Research has indeed 
shown that tariffs lead to higher prices being charged by local firms (Konings and 
Vandenbusche, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, trade barriers such as tariffs raise the cost of traded products, which may 
be passed through to the consumer in higher retail prices. Surprisingly, the 
literature on the direct effect of trade barriers on consumer prices is quite 
limited. Blonigen and Haynes (2002) found that antidumping duties, that is tariff 
duties designed to prevent the importation of goods at prices likely to damage 
domestic firms, are more than fully passed through. One recent related paper by 
Hwang (2016) on South Korea examined tariff reductions in the aftermath of 
joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and found that how price falls in this 
case were passed on to consumers was determined strongly by the level of 
competition within the retail sector and within product categories. Similar results 
were obtained by De Loecker et al. (2016) who found that some of the benefits of 
lower tariffs were absorbed by firms through higher mark-ups. It is likely that the 
level of competition and availability of substitutes would also be significant 
factors in how price increases would be passed onto consumers. A recent paper 
by Clarke et al. (2017) analysed the potential effect of Brexit on consumer prices 
in the UK. They found that the imposition of tariffs under a scenario where trade 
between the UK and the EU is subject to WTO tariffs would increase the average 
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cost of living in the UK by 1 per cent. Their analysis also showed that the impact 
differs across households with the unemployed, families with children and 
pensioners being most affected. 
 
This paper focuses on the consumer side of Brexit by looking at the contribution 
of UK imports to overall household expenditure in Ireland and how exposed this 
might be to tariffs or other related cost increases. The key question posed is to 
quantify how substantial this effect might be and how it could vary across 
households. We do this by combining data on trade, tariffs and other costs that 
could increase in the event of the UK exit from the EU and comparing this to Irish 
household expenditure. 
 
Our approach generates an estimate of potential increases in the level of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of between 2 per cent and 3.1 per cent. These 
increases are the equivalent of between €892 (increase in non-tariff trade costs) 
and €1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases) in the annual cost of its 
consumption basket for the average household. This increase is calculated in the 
absence of any change in consumer behaviour away from these products. While 
some expenditure shifts would be expected in response to prices changes, the 
extent to which households adjust depends in large part on the range of 
substitutes available and their prices. We do not model the dynamics of that 
response, keeping the focus of the paper on measuring the size of the initial price 
shift to which Irish consumers could potentially be exposed. The estimated 
effects in terms of the increase in the household basket could therefore be 
regarded as upper bounds of the household impact. We also make no assumption 
regarding further exchange rate movements which could offset or amplify the 
effects.  
 
Of possibly more concern than the size of this average impact is that these effects 
are very unevenly distributed across households. We show that households with 
lower income levels consume a higher share of products that would be most 
affected by increases in tariffs and trade cost and the overall effect is 
inversely related to the household income decile.  
 
DATA SOURCES 
In order to answer the question of how Brexit might impact on Irish CPI we 
combine data from a number of different sources – on trade flows, tariffs, non-
tariff barriers and household expenditure. This section describes each source in 
turn and the assumptions that underlie the subsequent analysis. 
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Trade data 
The first source is trade data from the customs records collected by the Central 
Statistics Office which we used to examine at a product-by-product level what 
Ireland imports from the UK. These data are collected at the 6-digit product level 
as defined by the international Harmonized System (HS). We also look at total 
Irish imports for each product in order to generate the UK share of total imports. 
 
Tariff data 
The second source of data relates to our estimates of how significant price 
increases could be in the introduction of tariffs. The assumption made is that in 
the absence of a trade deal or transitional arrangement, the EU’s register of 
‘most favoured nation’ tariffs listed with the WTO would be the fall-back position, 
either come March 2019 or at the end of a transition period. The uncertainty of 
both the final arrangements and their timing need to be borne in mind 
throughout the discussion of the following scenarios. The WTO schedule that we 
use as our baseline scenario are the tariffs applied by the EU to all external 
countries without a trade agreement and are therefore the highest level of tariffs 
that would be likely to apply, as any specific deal would be to lower tariffs on 
some if not all product lines. The WTO tariffs vary widely across products with 
many subject to a zero tariff while some products are subject to a tariff as high as 
80 per cent (for some beef products). Tariffs can be applied in two different ways 
– most of the WTO tariff rates are ad-valorem tariffs (i.e. charged as a percentage 
of the value of the goods being shipped) while others are applied as a charge per 
unit quantity or by weight. In some instances, the two methods are combined, as 
for example in the case of the tariff on fresh or chilled boneless bovine meat 
which is 12.8 per cent of the value of the product plus €303 per 100 kg (Lawless 
and Morgenroth, 2016). This implies that the aggregate impact of Brexit under a 
WTO scenario is a function of the detailed trade patterns and considerable 
variation in the impacts across countries, sectors, firms and households are 
possible. So far, the focus has been largely on the cross-country impacts with a 
focus on exporting firms with limited focus on how households might be exposed 
to changes in the trading environment.  
 
Non-tariff barriers 
As well as tariffs, potential increases in prices could be passed on to consumers 
arising from cost increases if additional customs procedures or other barriers to 
trade are applied. It is important to stress that many of these non-tariff barriers 
could come into place even in the event of a deal reducing tariffs considerably 
from their WTO levels, particularly if the UK exits the Customs Union. For this 
reason, we treat non-tariff barriers as our lower-bound estimate and an outcome 
combining WTO tariffs plus non-tariff barriers as our upper estimate. As it is 
difficult to envisage the imposition of tariffs without any degree of non-tariff 
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barriers (even in basic administration costs) being incurred, we present 
calculations based on either non-tariff barriers alone or based on a combination 
of non-tariff barriers and tariffs. In order to estimate the non-tariff barrier effects, 
we take data from the estimates generated by the World Bank by Kee et al. 
(2009) and described in IntertradeIreland (2017). ‘Non-tariff barriers’ is the term 
applied to a wide range of policy measures other than tariffs that restrict or 
discourage international trade flows. Some examples of non-tariff barriers on 
goods trade can include quantity limits, subsidies to domestic production and 
implicit barriers arising from technical requirements such as licensing, labelling, 
standards and sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules (rules designed to protect health 
and food safety). Non-tariff barriers also include administrative requirements that 
add cost or delays to imports such as customs inspections and documentation.  
 
Given their variety and complexity, non-tariff barriers can be difficult to measure. 
Research carried out by Kee et al. (2009) on behalf of the World Bank combine a 
wide range of non-tariff barriers at a detailed product level and convert them to 
an ad-valorem tariff (or price) equivalent. Their work provides estimates for 4,575 
HS six-digit product categories which we match to the trade flow data from the 
CSO. Their central estimate for all non-tariff barriers is equivalent to applying a 12 
per cent tariff. However, the tariff equivalent on some products can be many 
times this average effect. In over half of the products where non-tariff barriers 
are in effect, they find that the price effect of the non-tariff barrier is higher than 
the tariff.  
 
Looking at the pattern of non-tariff barriers across countries, Kee et al. (2009) 
show that richer countries tend to impose lower barriers on trade. On this basis, 
we assume that any potential non-tariff barriers between the EU and UK would 
be one-quarter of those estimated by Kee et al. (2009) given that the EU and UK 
will be starting from a point of completely harmonised regulatory and safety 
standards. This is in line with the approach taken by Dhingra et al. (2016) when 
estimating the effect on the UK economy of the UK exiting the EU. They use non-
tariff barrier estimates of EU-US trade but assume that the level that would apply 
to EU-UK trade would be between one-quarter (in their optimistic scenario) and 
three-quarters (in their pessimistic scenario) of the US level.  
 
Non-tariff barriers have moved to the forefront of a number of recent major 
trade negotiations. For example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA)2 between the EU and Canada removes almost all tariffs on 
goods between the signatories with a small number of exceptions in agricultural 
products bringing it extremely close to complete free trade. The bulk of the CETA 
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  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter.  
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text revolves around the removal or reduction of non-tariff barriers in both goods 
and services, highlighting that these are considered significant impediments to 
trade.  
 
A further issue to be borne in mind in terms of non-tariff barriers affecting Irish 
retail prices is the extent to which imports from other countries to Ireland are 
transhipped through the UK. Comparing trade and transport data sources, 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2017) estimate that approximately 11 per cent of Irish 
import volumes from markets other than the UK are transported across the UK 
‘land-bridge’. Although no tariffs would be imposed on these imports post-Brexit 
as they do not originate in the UK, there is the possibility that increased 
administration costs (e.g. to verify that the goods are destined for Ireland and not 
for the UK domestic market) and associated port delays could have a knock-on 
effect of increasing the cost of delivering those products to Ireland.  
 
Household expenditure data 
The level of current trade from the UK to Ireland and associated potential price 
increases are then combined with measures of how important these products are 
in the consumption expenditure baskets of households in order to gauge how this 
might affect different households and overall CPI. The data for this come from 
the Household Budget Survey (HBS) collected by the CSO in 2015-2016. The HBS 
is a large scale survey (over 6,800 households) that collects information on 
household expenditure patterns in order to appropriately weight price changes 
by their importance in household consumption for the Consumer Price Index. It 
provides very detailed information on expenditure at a product level, by 
households overall and also by income decile. We use the overall expenditure 
shares to generate our CPI aggregate estimate and provide additional evidence 
on the distributional differences of these trade related price increases across 
different household income groups (specifically we divide households into ten 
groups – deciles – based on their income levels).  
 
The first item of note in gauging household exposure to tariff related price 
increases is that the share of goods in the household basket declines considerably 
as household income increases. Households in higher income deciles tend to 
spend relatively more on services and are therefore somewhat less exposed to 
increases in good prices as is shown in Figure 1. On average across all households, 
approximately 45 per cent of expenditure is on goods and the other 55 per cent is 
on services (with housing being the single largest component). This share of 
goods in total expenditure ranges from 53 per cent in the third decile to just 35 
per cent in the highest income group.  
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We choose a number of specific examples of products where expenditure shares 
across household deciles differ and show these in Figure 2. We particularly note 
that the share of household expenditure on food declines considerably as 
household income increases. The poorest household groups allocate up to 15 per 
cent of their total expenditure to food and this declines to just 8 per cent for the 
highest income group. This is an important determinant of our overall results as 
food products have the highest tariff listings in the EU’s WTO tariff schedule and 
this therefore gives an early indication of how the distribution of post-Brexit 
tariffs could differ in their impact across household types. Other expenditure 
areas where we find considerable household income variation, such as the lowest 
income households spending a much higher fraction of their total expenditure on 
fuel and light (9 per cent compared to 3 per cent in higher income households), 
will be less affected by Brexit as tariffs in these product areas tend to be low. 
Working in the opposite direction, higher income households tend to spend 
somewhat more on vehicles and motor fuels. The share of spending in other 
areas such as alcohol and electronics are flatter over the income distribution. 
 
FIGURE 1 SHARE OF GOODS IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE BY INCOME DECILE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Household Budget Survey, 2015-2016. 
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FIGURE 2 VARIATION IN EXPENDITURE SHARES BY INCOME DECILE  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Household Budget Survey, 2015-2016. 
 
ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
In order to estimate how increased import costs might affect prices of consumer 
goods we combine the data sources described above in a number of different 
steps. The first of these is to match the WTO tariffs and product level estimates of 
the potential cost increases associated with non-tariff barriers to the imports 
from the UK and calculate the corresponding price effect. This gives a range of 
price increases at a product-by-product level. 
 
These products then need to be distinguished between intermediate and capital 
goods that would be primarily used by firms, and consumption goods used by 
households. Our method of doing this was to match the product codes used in 
the trade data (HS codes) to those used in the Household Budget (COICOP codes). 
In order to line up the two different systems, the trade codes were first 
converted into an intermediate classification called the Common Product 
Classification (CBC) and then converted again into the COICOP classification using 
concordances from the UN. This procedure gives us a matching between the 
imports and products reported as being purchased by households.  
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In order to allocate the price increases we make an assumption that any product 
listed in the HBS is purchased entirely by households. This will give an upper 
estimate as many of the products reported in the trade data (for example tea, 
coffee and laptop computers) will also be purchased by firms. However, although 
this may overestimate the direct effect of price increases faced by the consumer, 
the indirect effect should also be considered as increased costs for inputs used by 
Irish firms may also in many cases be passed on to the final consumer.  
 
FIGURE 3 CONSUMPTION AND INTERMEDIATE GOOD TARIFF AND NTB EXPOSURES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 3 shows how the tariff and non-tariff barrier cost increases vary across 
consumer and intermediate (all non-consumer) products. The non-tariff barrier 
(NTB) estimated price increases are over four times greater for consumption 
products than for non-consumption goods. Combining the non-tariff barriers with 
the WTO-registered tariffs generates a total price increase exposure of 5.5 per 
cent on UK imports of non-consumption goods and an increase of up to 21 per 
cent for consumption goods.3  
 
The next step of the methodology is to estimate how important the UK imports 
are in overall household spending for each product. To do this we calculate 
imports from the UK as a proportion of the total purchase of those goods by the 
households. However, as already mentioned some of the imported products, 
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  The WTO tariff impact alone on intermediates is 2.5 per cent whereas the tariff impact on consumption products is 
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even though classified here as consumption products, may also be purchased by 
firms. To minimise any overestimate of household exposure, we also compare the 
UK import share to total imports in each product category and use the lower of 
the two if there is any discrepancy. For example, when expressed as a share of 
household expenditure, imports of tea and coffee from the UK exceeded 100 per 
cent so this was replaced by the UK share of total imports in this product 
category which was 54 per cent.  
 
We now have an importance weight on each product for the UK share of each 
product. Figure 4 shows how the overall price increase for goods is generated by 
aggregating across all products, weighted by the share of these products 
imported from the UK. The price effect bars show how this scales down the 
overall tariff impacts shown in Figure 3, as they are now multiplied by the market 
share of the UK imports to give an overall impact on the price levels of these 
goods in the Irish economy. The CPI bars then show how these price increases 
translate into an overall CPI effect by further weighting the products by their 
importance in the household expenditure basket. 
 
FIGURE 4 PRICE INCREASES AND AGGREGATE CPI EFFECT 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
The tables in the Appendix give more detail on this by showing for each sector 
the tariff or non-tariff barrier increase in the cost of imports from the UK, the 
share of the UK in total expenditure and the combination to give the overall 
implied price effect. To take the example of bread and cereals, Table A.1 shows 
that the estimated tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers on these products is 36 
per cent. Imports from the UK are equivalent to 59 per cent of Irish household 
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expenditure in this product category so the impact on the total sector price of 
tariffs on the UK imports would be 21 per cent (36 per cent times 59 per cent). 
The concentration of the highest non-tariff barriers on food products is evident in 
Table A.1 with meat imports facing a 62 per cent tariff equivalent and milk, 
cheese and eggs facing a 43 per cent tariff equivalent. Table A.2 shows the 
combined non-tariff barrier estimates and Table A.3 the direct effect of tariffs 
alone.  
 
The tariff schedule shows that food and clothing tariffs are generally well in 
excess of 10 per cent while those on other manufactured products are relatively 
modest – zero rates on medical products and motor fuels, 1 per cent on 
electronics and 3 per cent on household appliances for example. Of 
manufactured products, only motor vehicles (cars, motorcycles and parts) face 
significant tariff rates at approximately 8 per cent.4 As discussed earlier, the 
method we followed was to apply tariffs and non-tariff barriers at the most 
disaggregated level possible and it should be noted that the rates summarised for 
the broad categories in the tables do mask some substantial variations even 
within the same category – meat tariffs for example range from approximately 10 
per cent on chicken to over 80 per cent on some beef products. 
 
The overall impact on Irish price levels of changes in trade costs on imports from 
the UK will also crucially depend on how important the UK is as a source of that 
product. Given the integration of retail and grocery markets, it is perhaps not 
surprising to see in Table A.1 that the UK is the origin of a substantial share of 
many products – most particularly in fresh and processed foods but also in 
household and personal non-durables (categories which include cleaning 
products and toiletries for example). It should be emphasised again at this point 
that such price increases on particular products would be likely to result in some 
changes in consumer choices being made but it is not possible to gauge in 
advance how large these would be without more detailed information on 
substitutes available and levels of competition in different product areas.  
 
The cross-product detail on non-tariff barriers in Table A.1 (and the combined 
effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in Table A.2) also shows a sharp difference 
between the impacts on food and manufactured products. They suggest in fact 
that even in the event of a trade deal that removes tariffs entirely, there may be 
a significant price impact on Irish consumers unless such a deal also minimises 
non-tariff barriers.  
 
 
                                                          
 
4
  The trade data do not distinguish between new and second-hand cars. 
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The final step is to translate these product level price changes into an overall CPI 
impact which is done by aggregating over all the price increases for each product 
and weighting them by the importance of that product in household 
consumption. This generates an estimate of potential increases in the level of CPI 
of between 2 per cent in the non-tariff barriers scenario and 3.1 per cent when 
both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are applied. These increases are the equivalent 
of between €892 and €1,360 in the annual cost of its consumption basket for the 
average household. The relatively larger impact of the non-tariff barrier costs 
compared to the tariffs is noteworthy although it should be emphasised that the 
international estimates used to proxy these costs are likely to be less accurate 
than the tariff estimates which come directly from the EU schedule published 
with the WTO. 
 
It should further be stressed that the CPI increase calculated here does not take 
account of any change in consumer behaviour in reaction to price increases, 
which is beyond the scope of the present exercise. The extent to which 
households adjust depends in large part on the range of substitutes available, 
ease of switching both for consumers and for retailer supply chains and the 
prices, which could also be affected by exchange rate movements (which to date 
have made UK imports more competitive). We do not model the dynamics of that 
response, keeping the focus of the paper on measuring the size of the price shift 
to which Irish consumers could potentially be exposed.  
 
The Household Budget Survey also provides detail on the expenditure patterns of 
different types of households. Dividing households into ten equally sized groups 
based on their income in Figure 5 shows that our estimated impact of post-Brexit 
cost increases has a substantial distributional effect. Households in the lowest 
income decile face increases of around 70 per cent higher than those in the 
highest income group. Households in the lowest income group would face a 4 per 
cent increase in prices in the event of both tariffs and non-tariff barrier obstacles 
being implemented. Table 1 converts the percentage increases into monetary 
amounts based on the annual average expenditure of each household income 
group. The 4 per cent increase for the lowest income households is equivalent to 
a €634 annual increase in cost of their current expenditure basket for these 
households, or €12 extra on their current weekly spending of €305. The 
percentage change effects are similar for the bottom three groups and then taper 
off gradually as household income increases. These generate higher monetary 
amounts however as spending levels are also going up. The 4.2 per cent increase 
for the third income group is equivalent to extra costs of €1,104 and the 3.8 per 
cent increase for the fourth group is an increase of €1,191. For the highest 
income households, the effects in the worst-case scenario would be 2.4 per cent. 
This is equivalent to an increased cost of their spending basket of €2,086 per 
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year. The difference in percentage impact is largely due to the higher share of 
household expenditure accounted for by food by lower income households.  
 
FIGURE 5 VARIATION ACROSS HOUSEHOLD INCOME DECILES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
TABLE 1 INCREASE IN BASKET COST BY INCOME DECILE 
 
Non-tariff barriers 
€ 
Tariffs + NTB 
€ 
1st decile  419  634 
2nd decile  531  809 
3rd decile  727  1,104 
4th decile  780  1,191 
5th decile  849  1,294 
6th decile  933  1,425 
7th decile  1,013  1,549 
8th decile  1,130  1,724 
9th decile  1,181  1,812 
10th decile  1,361  2,086 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper combines trade, tariffs and non-tariff barrier costs to estimate 
scenarios for the potential impact of Brexit on Irish imports. We examine how 
these trade changes could impact on households by linking the importance of 
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each of the traded products to consumption expenditure baskets of households 
collected by the Household Budget Survey. In estimating exposure to trade policy 
changes, a number of characteristics of different household income levels play an 
important role. Firstly, the share of goods in the household basket declines 
considerably as household income increases, with households in higher income 
deciles spending 35 per cent of their income on goods compared to 53 per cent in 
the third decile. Secondly, looking at specific categories of goods, we find that the 
share of household expenditure on food declines considerably as household 
income increases. This is an important determinant of our overall results as food 
products have the highest tariff listings in the EU’s WTO tariff schedule, which we 
assume would be the fall-back position in the absence of a trade deal or 
transition agreement by the Brexit deadline of March 2019.  
 
Comparing tariff and non-tariff barrier cost increases across consumer and 
intermediate inputs shows consumer goods to be considerably more exposed to 
changes in trade regime. The WTO tariff impact on products used as intermediate 
inputs for further processing is 2.5 per cent whereas the impact on consumption 
products is over 7 per cent. A similar pattern applies to estimates of non-tariff 
barriers which also fall disproportionately heavily on final consumption products, 
most notably food. 
 
Aggregating over the individual price increases for each product and weighting 
them by the importance of that product in household consumption gives us an 
estimate of potential increases in the level of CPI. Our estimate impacts range 
from 2 per cent in the non-tariff barrier scenario to an impact of 3.1 per cent 
when both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are applied. These increases are the 
equivalent of between €892 and €1,360 in the annual cost of its consumption 
basket for the average household. This assumes no change in consumer spending 
patterns as we try here to focus on the change in prices faced by households at 
the point of the imposition of a new trade regime. Given the size of the possible 
increases for some product categories, some change in consumer behaviour away 
from these products would be likely although we do not model this explicitly. The 
extent of switching would depend on a number of factors such as the range of 
substitutes available and their prices. In some instances, the effect could be of a 
reduction in the number of varieties on offer in certain product groups if the price 
increases considerably.  
 
We also find that the potential post-Brexit cost increases could have a substantial 
distributional effect. Households in the lowest income decile face increases of 
around 70 per cent higher than those in the highest income group. Households in 
the lowest income group would face a 4 per cent increase in prices in the event of 
both tariffs and non-tariff barrier obstacles being implemented compared to 2.4 
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per cent for the highest income group. This is largely due to the higher share of 
household expenditure accounted for by food by lower income households.   
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A.1 NTB ESTIMATES 
  
NTB tariff 
equivalent 
% 
UK import  
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 36  59  21  
Meat 62  24  15  
Fish and seafood 20  57  11  
Milk, cheese and eggs 79  38  30  
Oils and fats 46  27  13  
Fruit 25  14  3  
Vegetables 27  14  4  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 55  32  18  
Processed foods 27  44  12  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 29  54  16  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 27  56  15  
Spirits 9  27  2  
Wine 14  3  0  
Beer 6  8  0  
Tobacco 53  3  1  
Garments and clothing accessories 18  22  4  
Shoes and other footwear 24  13  3  
Household maintenance and repair goods 4  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 1  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  5  46  2  
Personal non-durable goods  1  68  1  
Furniture 8  36  3  
Household appliances and tools 3  38  1  
Reading material and stationery 1  27  0  
Vehicles 8  11  1  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 4  36  1  
Toys and games 10  31  3  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al, 2009). 
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TABLE A.2 WTO TARIFFS + NTB ESTIMATES 
  
Combined 
tariff equiv. 
% 
UK import 
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 52  59  30  
Meat 100  24  24  
Fish and seafood 30  57  17  
Milk, cheese and eggs 122  38  46  
Oils and fats 69  27  19  
Fruit 34  14  5  
Vegetables 36  14  5  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 84  32  27  
Processed foods 34  44  15  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 37  54  20  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 40  56  23  
Spirits 16  27  4  
Wine 22  3  1  
Beer 7  8  1  
Tobacco 91  3  2  
Garments and clothing accessories 30  22  6  
Shoes and other footwear 35  13  5  
Household maintenance and repair goods 7  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 2  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  9  46  4  
Personal non-durable goods  2  68  1  
Furniture 12  36  4  
Household appliances and tools 6  38  2  
Reading material and stationery 3  27  1  
Vehicles 16  11  2  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 7  36  3  
Toys and games 14  31  4  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers 
 (Kee et al, 2009). 
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TABLE A.3 WTO TARIFFS 
  
WTO tariff 
rate 
% 
UK import 
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 16  59  9  
Meat 38  24  9  
Fish and seafood 10  57  6  
Milk, cheese and eggs 43  38  16  
Oils and fats 23  27  6  
Fruit 9  14  1  
Vegetables 9  14  1  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 29  32  9  
Processed foods 8  44  3  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 7  54  4  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 13  56  7  
Spirits 7  27  2  
Wine 8  3  0  
Beer 0  8  0  
Tobacco 38  3  1  
Garments and clothing accessories 11  22  2  
Shoes and other footwear 10  13  1  
Household maintenance and repair goods 3  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 1  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  4  46  2  
Personal non-durable goods 1  68  0  
Furniture 4  36  2  
Household appliances and tools 3  38  1  
Reading material and stationery 1  27  0  
Vehicles 8  11  1  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 4  36  1  
Toys and games 4  31  1  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey and WTO tariff rates. 
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